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Abstract 
This thesis examines the effect of quality of government on low-intensity internal conflict, 
and how this relationship could be conditioned by the extent of ethnic division, in a 
context of developing and newly industrialised countries. It hypothesises that 
(H1) impartial bureaucracy reduces internal conflict, and that (H2) this effect is diminished 
in highly ethnically divided societies, and finally test these propositions empirically by 
using data from the Quality of Government Institute’s Expert Survey and the Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). 
 The main analysis suggests that quality of government reduces internal conflict. This 
is consistent with hypothesis 1 and the theoretical framework, which posits that quality of 
government reduce internal conflict by diminishing the opportunity space for the conflict, 
by preventing the onset of grievances between societal groups, and finally by making 
political commitments more credible. 
 The robustness checks call the initial findings into question. The main takeaway with 
regard to H1 is that the results depend on how “conflict” is measured. When conflict is 
measured as riots and protests, the results are inconclusive. 
 The results are inconclusive when it comes to how ethnic division affects the 
relationship between quality of government and internal conflict. In general, the analysis 
points in neither direction. However, in one model, the data suggests that it is in ethnically 
divided societies that quality of government significantly reduces violence against civilians 
– contrary to what was expected.  
 Future research should make an effort to improve data on QoG and conflict. 
Keywords: quality of government, impartiality, institutional trust, governance, good 
governance, political institutions, administration, bureaucracy, internal conflict, new wars, 
riots, protests, demonstrations, security, peace, corruption, rule of law, political science. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2003:295, Knack said: “Not only does governance matter, but research contributing to 
our understanding of governance matters”. This is certainly true today when a substantial 
amount of the world’s population lives in, or is driven away from, countries affected by 
some sort of internal conflict, ranging from abduction and persecution to full scale civil 
war. States do not go to war with one another as often as they did before. Instead, intrastate 
conflict is the type of conflict that most likely is endured by the world’s populaces today. 
 Knowing this, scholars have begun to investigate whether political institutions or 
“governance” in general have an impact on internal conflict. Needless to say, a better 
understanding of the causal effects of different political institutions and ultimately, the 
drivers of peace and conflict, has an immense relevance for policy-makers and a potential 
to make real-life changes for millions of people. 
 This thesis makes two contributions to previous research. First, by introducing a type 
of internal conflict which is normally not considered in the literature – low intensity 
internal conflict – it makes an important empirical contribution. Second, by using the 
concept of quality of government as independent variable, it makes a theoretical 
contribution. The closest concept used so far in conflict research is “state capacity”. It 
receives critique however from various directions for being conceptually weak, among 
other things. The thesis finally investigates how the relationship between quality of 
government and internal conflict is affected by ethnically divided societies. 
 As far as the theoretical framework is concerned, governmental institutions, i.e., 
bureaucracies, have a potential to affect internal conflict by shrinking the conflict’s 
opportunity space, by helping to resolve grievances between conflicting groups in society 
and finally by making political actors’ commitments more credible –which in turn would 
make conflict a less attractive alternative for potential dissidents. 
 The analysis initially points towards promising effects of quality of government on 
internal conflict but the latter part of the analysis nuances the image somewhat. In any 
case, this thesis is an interesting contribution to the exploration of the causal effects, and 
possible importance, of impartial governmental organisations.  
  I start the thesis by reviewing and identifying points of improvements in the previous 
literatures of conflict, state capacity and ethnicity. I thereafter proceed to the theoretical 
framework and explain the concept of quality of government and its essential part: 
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impartiality. I also provide three sets of mechanisms by which quality of government could 
plausibly affect internal conflict: opportunity space, grievances and commitment problems.  
 The second half of the thesis is devoted to presentation of the data and methods and 
finally the main analysis with its robustness checks. I round up by giving suggestions on 
how future research could help move the frontier forward in this field of research. 
2. What is known about institutions and internal 
conflict 
I will now position this thesis in the academic literature by briefly reviewing a few areas 
that are relevant for quality of government and internal conflict. I will consider the 
literatures of conflict, political institutions, state capacity, quality of government and finally 
the ethnic context. 
2.1 (Internal) conflicts 
Although there are some critics (e.g., Newman, 2004), many scholars now recognise or 
subscribe to the term new wars. The term suggests that there is a noticeable difference in 
the ways conflicts occurred or were conducted decades ago compared with today. Whereas 
conflict and war previously were something clearly discernible, for instance by the 
involvement of two professional or conscripted armies, official states as combatants and a 
distinct battlefield, new conflicts tend to be characterised by a diluted distinction between 
wartime and peacetime, state failure and a blur of the previously clear division between 
civilians and combatants (Benziman, 2017). These new conflicts seem to go on forever and 
have no clear start nor end. They also tend to involve non-state actors – and civilians are 
deliberately targeted to a greater extent than before (see Newman, 2004 for a complete 
comment on new wars). 
 Although the amount of civil war activity was not historically unique in the 1990s, it 
was first after the end of the Cold War that both the UN and academia identified these new 
wars as a prominent issue for the future and subsequently launched a wave of research to 
investigate it (Mundy, 2011). Today, when looking the numbers, we see that internal 
conflict is by far more common and recurrent than interstate conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004; Ray and Esteban, 2017) and around thirty percent of the world’s population inhabit 
countries that are touched by conflict in some way (Fearon, 2011). 
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 Both the short and long-term consequences that follow violent conflict are also well-
documented today. Internal conflict rather quickly entails refugee flows and forced 
migration, as well as demolished infrastructure and capital flight (Gates, Hegre, Mokleiv 
Nygård and Strand, 2012). It is one of the major obstacles to subsequent economic 
development (Fearon, 2011) and has clear detrimental effects on development indicators 
such as poverty reduction, hunger reduction, child mortality reduction and access to 
potable water or primary education (Gates et al., 2012). When taking a longer perspective, 
intrastate conflict has substantial impact on civilian suffering that amounts to at least the 
same level of misery as during the conflict itself (Ghobarah, Huth and Russett, 2003). 
 The quantitative research that explicitly focuses on political institutions’ effects on 
internal conflict has so far been focused on state capacity and civil war (examples are 
Fearon, 2011; Besley and Persson, 2010; Thies, 2010). Some studies have tried to use 
different concepts, for instance Hegre and Nygård (2012) that use a broader version of 
quality of government, but the point to be made is that current research is focused on civil 
war and often disregards other types of conflict. This is a matter raised by Ray and 
Esteban (2017) as they remind us that there are many different types of conflicts in the 
world. We may potentially be missing out on empirical results and interesting patters in 
the literature because the conflicts at hand do not reach a certain threshold number of 
hundreds or thousands of deaths (defining civil war involves many dimensions and many 
issues are problematic, see Mundy 2011 for a review). 
 Various forms of organised unrest and active discontent do not always or necessarily 
lead to high numbers of fatalities, but they can still have long-lasting consequences for 
social tension. In the long run, their cost may even exceed those coming directly from civil 
war (Ray and Esteban, 2017). In this view, we might think of coups, imprisonment on 
political grounds and demonstrations – and a recent example that springs to mind are the 
huge demonstrations and the violence that accompanied them before, during and after the 
illegal referendum in Catalonia on 1 October 2017 (Jones and Burgen, 2017). This incident 
did not produce high fatality rates and would therefore have been missed by previous 
research – despite the fact that it can argued that this was a substantial manifestation of 
social tensions and therefore worth being taken into consideration. 
 Understanding the drivers of civil war is an important task that should not be 
discredited but it is my opinion that the road to civil war is both long and crooked. It is not 
unimaginable that other types of violence manifest themselves long before a conflict 
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escalates to the point of civil war. To address this shortcoming in the literature, this thesis 
will measure internal conflict differently from civil war. I will be looking at sorts of low 
intensity conflict, such as riots and protests, and violence against civilians. 
2.2 The institutional turn 
Before advancing any further, it is important that the reader keep two things in mind: the 
definition of institutions and the political system’s input and output sides. 
 When it comes to institutions, there is a never-ending debate on its definition 
(Hodgson, 2006). One of the more important issues is whether there is a separation 
between institutions and organisations. A prominent definition is the one of 
North (1991:97): 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. 
They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), 
and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). 
By this definition, institutions are the rules of the game. North (2005) also explicitly says 
that while institutions are the rules of the game, organisations are the players – thus 
separating the two of them. Other scholars posit instead that organisations are a kind of 
institution and that no categorical separation should be made between them (Hodgson, 
2006:8). The important thing to remember is that by saying “institutions”, some scholars 
may refer to the rules of the game, while others may refer to an organisation. This thesis 
adheres to the second definition of institutions as I am interested in political organisations 
and bureaucracies. 
 As for the political system, based on the work of Easton (1957), this can be can be 
viewed as having an input and an output side (with a black box in the middle). The input 
side concerns policy creation and aspects like elections, constitution-writing and state 
institution building. The output side regards policy implementation and provision of 
services for the citizens. 
 In the mid-1990s, something which can be described as an institutional turn began 
when researchers in political economy started to ask themselves whether institutions (as 
rules of the game) cause long-term growth (Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2010:198). It is 
increasingly recognised today that institutions and politics are central for economic growth 
(Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2010:197; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Gaygisiz, 2013). 
This emphasis on institutions subsequently spread from economics to other fields in the 
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social sciences (political science for instance) and it was picked up by the aid community, 
under the name of “good governance” (Nanda, 2006). 
 With regard to internal conflict, a more recent development in the literature has been a 
shift away from focusing on institutions on the input side of the political system – to the 
output side. The input side – democracy in general or political systems such as 
parliamentarism or presidentialism – has already been connected to economic 
development (Lipset, 1959; Kormendi and Meguire, 1985) and conflict (e.g., de Nardo, 
1985) and it is still being researched (Reynal-Querol, 2005). The results have however been 
mixed. For example, the international aid community has been determined for quite some 
time to create Western-style democratic regimes in developing and post-war countries as a 
remedy against renewed conflict. But unfortunately, these democratic reconstruction 
models have produced poor results and conflict has often reoccurred (Ottaway, 2003; Call 
and Cook, 2003). 
 For reasons like this, scholars are beginning to ask themselves whether institutions the 
output side of the political system may be more relevant than democratisation itself for a 
sustainable peace in developing countries (Brinkerhoff, 2011:143). Many of these newer 
studies focus on “governance” related to the state, but excluding non-state actors, for 
example NGOs, and they often make use of dependent variables that may fall under a 
general umbrella of state capacity. 
2.3 State capacity and quality of government (QoG) 
As with many concepts, there is no consensus over what state capacity is (Hegre, and 
Nygård, 2015) but Mann (1984) has given a definition that is widely used in the literature. 
Mann defines state capacity in terms of what he calls infrastructural power: 
The capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions 
throughout the realm (Mann, 1984:189).  
[It] denotes the power of the state to penetrate and centrally co-ordinate the activities of civil society 
through its own infrastructure (Mann (1984:190). 
At a general level, state capacity thus translates into the ability to “get things done”. In a 
similar way, Migdal (cited in Lindvall and Teorell, 2016:5) describes state capacity as “the 
ability of state leaders to use the agencies of the state to get people in the society to do what 
they want them to do”. When talking about state capacity, we thus find ourselves, at least in 
part, on the output side of the political system where decisions are to be implemented by 
governmental bureaucracies and other organisations. 
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 Several studies find that the risk for internal conflict diminishes when state capacity 
increases. Walter (2015) maintains that it is political factors that strongly affect whether 
peace emerges or war restarts. Civil wars are more likely to repeat themselves in weakly 
institutionalised settings (looking at how open the political environment is and the 
restraints on the executives). Similarly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) reach the conclusion that 
civil wars occur more often in countries with financially, organisationally and politically 
weak central governments and weak states. They state: “What matters is whether active 
rebels can hide from government forces and whether economic opportunities are so poor 
that the life of a rebel is attractive” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003:28). Finally, Fearon (2011) 
claims to be the first to use several governance indicators (the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, the International Country Risk Guide, and the World Bank’s Country Policy 
Institutional Assessment) as a measurement of the quality of a country’s governance. He 
finds that good governance is associated with less conflict (fewer civil war onsets). 
 Certainly, many studies find that higher state capacity decreases the risk of internal 
conflict. There is however not yet a consensus in the literature. There are examples, for 
instance Thies (2010), that contrarily do not find any effect of state capacity on civil war. 
There is also research that points towards an opposite causal direction – that conflict 
mainly affects state capacity (Sobek, 2010). 
 Another point of weakness to bring up is the fact that the state capacity literature has 
issues with the definitions and the outcomes it tries to investigate. Lee and 
Zhang (2016:130) write:  
Scholars continue to disagree about the role of state capacity in explaining civil war […] Part of this 
problem stems from the difficulty in specifying conceptually clear definitions of state capacity and the 
inability to arbitrate between competing state capacity mechanisms. 
In practice, this means that the literature on state capacity is impaired by definitions and 
theories that are teleological and functionalistic (Lindvall and Teorell, 2017). Studies 
sometimes equate state capacity to the outcomes that the study itself is investigating, for 
example that states that achieve large tax extractions are high capacity states – compared to 
conceiving the phenomenon as if the capacity of the state enables it to extract a lot of taxes.  
 The same critique can be put forward for the governance literature in general (Glaeser, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2004; Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2010:202). On the 
most troublesome occasions, it is pointed out, “good” governance or high institutional 
capacity is taken to mean “anything that is good for either the economy or the citizens”, 
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definitions that are tautological and eventually do not mean anything (Rothstein and 
Teorell, 2008). 
 To address these aforementioned issues, this thesis will step away from “state capacity” 
and instead use another concept situated on the output side of the political system that 
focuses on governmental bureaucracy, namely, quality of government, QoG. 
 Quality of government will be more closely defined in the theoretical section 3.1 but 
essentially, whereas state capacity refers to the extent to which states exercise power in the 
first place, quality of government refers to how state power is exercised (Lindvall and 
Teorell (2017). Quality of government thus involves procedural norms and constraints. 
 Quantitative research that explicitly uses the concept of quality of government is hard 
to find. Wig and Forø Tollefsen (2016) are the exception. They show that there are mostly 
case studies on this subject and proceed to investigate local institutional quality and the 
incidence of violence from organised armed groups. Their outcome variable is conflicts 
with at least 25 battle deaths per year and they find that local institutional quality, as 
perceived by citizens, matter for local conflict. They measure QoG as: trust in local 
politicians, local police and courts; perceived police corruption and political corruption; 
performance rating of local politicians and finally community meeting attendance. 
Admittedly, Wig and Forø Tollefsen have moved away from the otherwise prevalent use of 
civil war as outcome, but they still do not consider other types of conflict than the most brutal 
ones (originating from armed groups). 
 Hegre and Nygård (2015) also ask whether well governed countries are better suited to 
avoid internal conflict. They, too, try to move away from the concept of state capacity and 
include “informal governance” in what they define as “quality of governance”. Their 
informal governance includes: bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, corruption, economic 
policies, military involvement in politics, political exclusion and repression. By formal 
institutions, they mean “de jure institutions that ensure that the executive branch of 
government is elected by a majority or plurality of the population” (ibid:990), which 
basically means democracy. Hegre and Nygård find that high quality governance reduces 
the risk of renewed civil war. However, they purposely, use a very wide concept of quality 
of governance that includes both institutions as the rules of the game and institutions as 
organisations – thus factors from both sides of the political system.  
 My opinion is that it is more pertinent for our understanding of political institutions 
causal effects on internal conflict if we separate the institutions from the input and output 
sides of the political system instead of doing a cocktail of “governance” in which we put 
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everything. In any case, Hegre and Nygård try to analyse whether their formal or informal 
institutions matters most. They conclude that the informal governance might be more 
important than the formal one, while adding that their analysis is somewhat inconclusive. 
They end by saying that any improvement of the governance indicators in either formal or 
informal institutions decrease the risk of conflict recurrence and is therefore desired. This 
might sound reassuring but several scholars have found that an amelioration of democracy 
(formal institution according to Hegre and Nygård) is not unconditionally positive (see 
e.g., Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch, 2001:33). Indeed, most conflicts seem to occur 
in semi-democracies where polities move from being dictatorships towards democracy. 
The assertion that improving just about any institution is desirable may therefore be more 
complex when other research is considered. 
 To recapitulate. In order to avoid various issues with previous research involving state 
capacity, this thesis will use the concept of quality of government. This involves institutions 
“as organisations” on the output side of the political system. The thesis will also focus on 
only the output side of the political system instead of combining factors from the two sides. 
2.4 Ethnicity and conflict 
I have until now situated this thesis in the literature that deals with political institutions 
and internal conflict. This, however, might not be sufficient for us to get a good 
understanding of the drivers of internal conflict. In essence, quality of government cannot 
be expected to explain everything when it comes to internal conflict in a polity. Indeed, 
contextual factors might be just as important. One of these contextual factors is ethnicity, 
or more specifically ethnic divisions (there are many variants of these divisions in the 
literature, e.g., ethnic fractionalisation or ethnic domination). 
 The ethnicity literature investigates ethnicity’s effects on, for instance, economic 
growth or peace. In the internal conflict research, ethnic divisions are thought to be one of 
the main drivers for civil war (Ray and Esteban, 2017). One of the reasons for this would be 
that ethnic identity is based on fundamental elements that are hard to change, such as 
language, race and religion. This may render democracy difficult if it entails ethnic political 
parties and ethnic voting (Østby, 2008:147; Horowitz, 2014). 
 The ethnicity research on internal conflicts is so far straggling and pointing in many 
directions. Already in the 90s, scholars began to see that national boundaries matter less 
and less in the world’s conflicts (Cohen, 1997:607) but despite this, it remains rather 
unexplored how the effects of institutional designs are conditioned by contextual factors 
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such as a society’s ethnic composition (Ansorg, Haass and Strasheim, 2013:21). 
Additionally, a lot of research have looked at only the input side of the political system. 
Cohen (1997) finds for example that proportional institutions outperform majoritarianism 
in ethnic conflict management – and Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) find that large 
ethnic groups that are excluded from state power (or underrepresented in government) are 
substantially more likely to challenge the incumbents by violent means.  
 There is no unanimity in the civil war research on the effects of ethnic divisions. Many 
studies find no relationship between ethnic fractionalisation, ethnic conflict, and civil wars 
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), for example, find that political institutions are more important than ethnic 
divisions for explaining civil war. Other studies are however not so quick to rule out ethnic 
division’s importance (e.g., Cederman, et al., 2010; Fearon, 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Ray 
and Esteban, 2017). In short, this leaves the literature inconclusive. 
 This thesis will take on the subject by empirically estimating the interactive effect of 
ethnic division on the quality of government. There is some research that suggests that 
ethnic divisions affect government institutions themselves. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1999), for example, conclude that ethnic diversity leads to corruption 
and lower government performance. Furthermore, on an adjacent subject, Brinkerhoff 
(2011) points to the potential conflict-mitigating effects that institutions (as organisations) 
might have when it comes to service delivery in society to citizens, but also adds that the 
beneficial effects often are mediated by prior and contemporary patterns of ethnic 
relations, among other things. 
 In fact, Ansorg et al. (2013:23) strongly advice the academic society to begin exploring 
the interactions between different contextual factors, for example ethnic, religious or 
ideological divisions, and political institutions. In this view, Tajima (2009:IV), in a study on 
order and violence in authoritarian breakdowns, remarks that  
the broader lesson is that order is not simply a function of how closely the state approaches Leviathan but 
rather the way society interacts with the state and how it responds. (I emphasise.) 
There seems to be almost no previous research that focuses on this combination of QoG, 
ethnic division and internal conflict other than civil war. The relationship between 
institutions in general and ethnic conflict has, furthermore, been quite underresearched 
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with regard to large-N analyses (Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, and Stanton, 2002:105). 
Easterly’s study (2001) comes somewhat close in the meaning that institutions’ effects on 
conflict is investigated and also interacted with ethnic diversity. The finding is that there is 
a significant interaction effect between governance and ethnic diversity and that this alters 
whether ethnic conflict is destructive or contained. However, Easterly uses a rather 
economic conception of governance, e.g., freedom from expropriation and freedom of 
repudiation of contracts – all of which are quite far from quality of governance that this 
thesis will be using. 
 Moreover, Easterly uses ethnic fractionalisation as a measurement for ethnic division. 
Some scholars have come to the conclusion that this variable is less suitable for operationalising 
ethnic divisions in research assessing societal effects on internal conflict (Østby, 2008). 
Accordingly, this might be the reason for which scholars on ethnicity and conflict reach 
contradicting results so far. Instead, it is argued that polarisation is a much more pertinent 
measurement (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Østby, 2008). 
 This thesis will therefore make use of the concept of ethnic polarisation. While ethnic 
fractionalisation relates to the number of ethnic groups in a country, polarisation refers to 
the number of large groups. It is a measurement of horizontal inequality between groups, 
rather than between individuals. A country with high levels of ethnic fractionalisation need 
not, at the same time, score high on an index of polarisation, which on the contrary might 
be very low. 
2.5 Summary 
As a recapitulation, I remind that I have tried to synthesise three different literatures: 
internal conflict, institutions (specifically state capacity and QoG) and finally ethnic 
division in the context of internal conflict. 
 The focus on new wars has led to an upsurge of literature on state capacity or 
governance’s effects on civil war. Other types of conflicts can nonetheless be just as 
important to consider. Despite this, they are often overlooked. Low intensity, internal conflict 
will be the focus in this thesis. 
 Political institutions on the output side of the political system, conceptualised as state 
capacity, has mainly been found to decrease the risk of civil war but the definition or 
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measurement of state capacity itself raises critiques of conceptual vagueness and a 
functionalistic slant. Quality of government may solve this and will be used instead. 
 The literature on the relationship between ethnic divisions and civil war is inconclusive. 
Some scholars nonetheless stress the importance of context for political institutions and 
internal conflict. Previous results might depend on the measurement of ethnic divisions – 
ethnic polarisation could be a better measurement than ethnic fractionalisation, in this view.   
 This thesis will thus answer the following research questions: 
 How does quality of government affect low-
intensity, internal conflict?  
 
 How is this relationship affected by  
levels of ethnic division? 
3. Theoretical framework for QoG and internal conflict 
Wig and Forø Tollefsen (2016) have reviewed the literature and explain that the theoretical 
arguments for how political institutions may matter for internal conflict can be sorted into 
three categories (Blattman and Miguel, 2010, mention something similar). 
 First, institutions may check the greed of actors or groups of actors and thereby shrink 
the opportunity space of the conflict; second, institutions may alleviate grievances between 
groups which otherwise could lead to discontent and engender unrest; finally, institutions 
may help solve commitment problems. 
 Importantly, Østby (2008:145) points out that the “greed-or-grievance” debate should 
not be depicted in “either–or” terms. This would be a too simplistic way to understand the 
inherently complex drivers and dynamics of internal conflict. This view is supported by 
Walter (2015:1247) who underlines that the mechanisms are likely to be multifold. We 
must remind ourselves that there are probably several factors at play at the same time. 
 This section provides a brief explanation of each category and shows how it is thought 
that political institutions reduce internal conflict. I will begin with a presentation of the 
central concept of quality of government. 
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3.1 The concept of quality of government 
In 2008, Rothstein and Teorell published a theory of quality of government that seeks to 
settle what they see as problematic previous definitions of governance that are too broad, 
functionalistic or only deal with corruption. They propose that the central ingredient in 
quality of government be the norm of impartiality in the exercise of political power. It is 
based on the idea that democratic, political equality on the input side of the political system 
(that deals with the access to public authority) must be complemented with equality on the 
output side (that deals with the exercise of public authority). The definition of impartiality 
that Rothstein and Teorell use is: 
When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into consideration anything 
about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law (Rothstein and Teorell, 
2008:170). 
Rothstein and Teorell point out that quality of governance does not imply rules on how 
governmental organisations should look like, nor what content policies should have, but 
QoG is a procedural norm. What matters is that a “state ought to treat equally those who 
deserve equally” (Kurer cited in Rothstein and Teorell, 2008:171) and impartiality should, 
above all, be a feature of the actions and activities of public civil servants, politicians, 
judges, and so on. 
 For this theory, impartiality is the most important factor but Rothstein and Teorell also 
point out that QoG has a relationship with other things in political system, namely, 
corruption, rule of law, effectivity/efficiency and democracy itself. 
 As for corruption, impartiality implies the absence of corruption but the reverse is not 
necessarily true (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008:171). More precisely, it is possible for a polity 
to have zero corruption and yet have partial exercise of public power (for instance 
clientelism, patronage and favouritism). QoG is thus something more than merely an 
absence of corruption. 
 Regarding rule of law, the procedural impartiality that constitutes quality of 
government already incorporates rule of law (in practice, impartiality, necessitate a set of 
rules that determine conventional conduct and it needs to be consistently applied to 
everyone). But, like with corruption, QoG is something more than just rule of law. 
Impartiality also applies to other domains than those governed directly by law – e.g., when 
public officials implement policy (ibid:182). 
 Turning to effectivity, in contrast to for example state capacity, effectiveness and 
efficiency of public institutions are secondary to impartiality. Certainly, effectiveness and 
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efficiency could be expected to be part of quality of government – it would be strange to 
claim that a polity has high quality of government if close to no services are delivered, to 
high costs. But, for theoretical and normative underpinnings, impartiality always come 
before utility (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008:182). 
 Finally, democracy. Rothstein and Teorell argue along the lines that democracy might 
be a necessary condition for QoG, but it is certainly not sufficient. Democracy cannot 
guarantee either impartial decision-making or policy content. The tyranny of the majority 
is an obvious case in this view. On the other hand, it is plausible that democracy is helpful 
to quality of government because impartiality on the output side of the political system 
might follow easier if a polity already applies the principles of political equality 
(impartiality, so to speak) on the input side, for instance equal access to power through free 
and fair elections. 
 In short, quality of government’s central feature is impartiality. The absence of 
corruption, the presence of rule of law, the effectivity and democracy are all secondary to 
impartiality. We will now turn to the theoretical relationship between QoG and internal 
conflict by overviewing the three main strands in this research: opportunity space, 
grievances and commitment problems. 
3.2 Opportunity space 
The first set of theoretical arguments regards the opportunity space of internal conflicts. 
This interpretation focuses on different conditions that either facilitate a conflict’s eruption 
or contrastively impedes it (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and 
political institutions are among these factors. One of the arguments that speak for the 
importance of the conflict’s opportunity space is for example that, given the right 
conditions, it seems that insurgencies can break out even though the polity is democratic in 
character (e.g., gives civil rights to its citizens). Furthermore, small numbers of insurgents 
might survive for a long time despite the fact that the government has a large state 
apparatus at its disposal (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and thereby should be able to repress the 
insurgency fast. 
 On the one hand are factors that are thought to make conflict easier to sustain, for 
instance when countries have commodity exports that can be extorted and the money used 
for financing insurgencies, or when there is widespread poverty that make (mostly) men 
more prone to join private militias, e.g., because unemployment leaves the men with a lot 
of free time and the lack of money may drive them to criminality. 
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 On the other hand, we have conditions that are thought to shrink the opportunity 
space for conflict. Secondary schooling is, for example, expected to raise costs of rebel 
recruitment. In this view, impartial political institutions are a factor that raise the 
opportunity costs. Wig and Forø Tollefsen (2016:32) argue that “local institutions are 
opportunity structures that affect the costs and benefits of resorting to violence.” They 
explain that high quality institutions may make conflict more costly because they, for 
instance, would make the police force more efficient and the justice system stronger. 
Corrupt public servants, on the other hand, can be manipulated, coerced or bought by 
dissident groups which may fuel the conflict. 
 However, these arguments seem more suitable for state capacity than for quality of 
government. Indeed, Wig and Forø Tollefsen (2016:32) envisage quality institutions as a 
“constituent element” in state capacity. The corruption or efficiency of the police force and 
the judicial system may certainly play a part in raising opportunity costs. Public 
institutions, such as the police, will thereby be more able to prevent actors from for 
example entering a locality. But ability (to deter) is, as we have seen above in section 2.3, an 
issue of state capacity rather than impartiality and quality of government. 
 This channel of preventing conflict, furthermore, seems less suitable in explaining why 
a conflict occurs in the first place (as opposed to a reoccurring conflict) because it is 
assumed that there already are insurgents and rebel groups “out there”, calculating costs 
and benefits – but where did these come from in the first place? 
3.3 Grievances 
The second set of arguments that connects political institutions to internal conflict 
concerns grievances. What is accentuated here is that political institutions may affect 
internal conflict by alleviating (or causing) relative deprivation between groups. Hegre and 
Nygård (2015) point out that even rising objective inequalities might be perceived as 
acceptable and thus be no cause of strife – but once they are perceived as an issue, 
problems of internal conflict might soon follow. This may especially be true if dissident 
groups or individuals see the government (with its bureaucracies) as the source of the 
discrepancy between the expectation of what the people should have and what they are 
getting.  
 Disputes between groups of people may be organised around several factors, such as 
social class, ethnic origin, religion or simply by geographical region and they may have 
their origins in economic or political inequalities (Murshed, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). 
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As far as economics is concerned, there can be a matter of systematic discrimination which 
often has a colonial past. Examples are asset inequality, unequal land distribution and a 
discriminatory fiscal dimension that, through public spending or unjust taxing, ignores or 
disadvantages some groups in society (Murshed, 2002:390). On the more political side, 
there can be a lack of political rights or unequal access to benefits that come from political 
patronage, e.g., jobs and appointments. 
 The connection between political institutions and internal conflict, in the light of 
grievances, is quite straight forward. If the state is failing, through its governmental 
bureaucracies, to provide the same public goods to everyone (thus impartially), civil 
conflict might follow – not least because it would be a rational reaction to protest against 
inequalities. Indeed, Murshed (2002) points to the importance of a functioning social 
contract (one in which everyone benefits from public goods, for example state security). 
Disagreements between groups per se need not be a cause for conflict (disagreements are 
not necessarily violent) but if one group is left out from enjoying certain public goods or 
prevented from fulfilling expectations that another group can fulfil, this could quickly be 
perceived as unjust and problematic by the group that is left out. Conflict may thereafter be 
the outcome of rational decisions to settle injustices. Murshed (2002:388) brings up the 
Rwandan genocide as a (particularly) violent example – the genocide was planned well in 
advance and had clearly set objectives during the conflict – conflicts can thus rational 
rather than irrational, which many claim to be the case. 
 Wig and Forø Tollefsen (2016) mention that institutional quality may have a direct as 
well as an indirect effect on grievances. A direct effect is for example when certain African 
rebels claim that unjust political institutions are the main reasons and motives for taking 
up arms (Meredith cited in Wig and Forø Tollefsen, 2016). It may also be a matter of 
partial service delivery that disadvantages a specific geographical or administrative region 
in which an ethnic group resides. 
 A more indirect effect is mentioned by Le Billon (2003). Poor governance and 
corruption possibly interrupts and skews local investments and expenditures in public 
goods (ibid:417). This might for example affect public programmes, infrastructure and 
education. A discriminative public programme (or the absence of one altogether) may or 
may not cause troubles today but it could in the long run deprive certain groups of 
opportunities and better socioeconomic conditions, thereby raising inequalities. Worsened 
grievances between groups, caused by governmental organisations, could thereafter lead to 
open conflict. 
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 This channel seems more suitable than the opportunity space for my understanding of 
quality of government and internal conflict. In order for bureaucracies to succeed in 
addressing grievances instead of causing them, they must ensure that they are non-biased 
in their implementation of public policy, that is, they need to be impartial. This way, 
quality of government may plausibly have an independent effect on internal conflict. Let us 
now proceed to the last set of explanations of internal conflict. 
3.4 Commitment problems  
The third and last set of arguments regards commitment problems between different groups 
in a polity as well as between the citizens and the state (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; 
Walter, 2015; Lapuente and Rothstein, 2014). 
 The central issue in commitment problems is that actors or groups may be unable to 
credibly commit themselves to following through on political promises, settlements or even 
threats (Powell, 2012). These issues apply even for actors with good intentions (Kirschner, 
2010). The adversary in a political issue does not trust its opponent and instead weighs 
different aspects against each other, for instance: the future shifts in the distribution of 
power between groups, the incentives to not commit to the promises and the cost of the 
outcomes for both entering a settlement or not entering it (Austvoll Nome, 2013; 
Kirschner, 2010). After these judgements, the actor possibly either enter political 
negotiations or resorts to violence. Political institutions enter the equation because they 
may facilitate the former or aggravate the latter outcome.  
 Some scholars posit that commitment problems are among the most prominent 
reasons for explaining internal conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Svensson, 2007). 
Walter (2015), points to the importance of political and legal institutions in helping 
incumbent elites to credibly commit themselves. Any political settlement is expected to 
depend on whether the parties trust each other and whether they consider that the reforms 
that are put forward will be both implemented and upheld in the future. Hartzell and 
Hoddie (2003), furthermore, underline that adversaries in a post-conflict setting are asked 
to make political concessions and enter into agreements in an environment rife with 
suspicion and scepticism. Key issues often regard the safety and future, both short and 
long-term, of all the groups in the conflict. The control over the state’s governmental 
institutions, like public bureaucracy, is connected to this because no group wants to let 
another use the power of the state, through its organisations, to secure what was not won 
during the conflict. This situation, where public administration is substantively connected 
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to politics and ethnicity through patron–client networks (thus different groups in society), 
is no news in some parts of the world. It is a widespread phenomenon in for example 
Africa (Berman, 2004) and it can play a big role in citizens everyday life. 
 This theory on credible commitment, however, rests on at least three assumptions that 
Walter (2015) brings up. First, all parties of the conflict must prefer settlement to conflict. 
Second, the majority of the citizens in the polity must also have an interest in 
compromising. This is not necessarily the case. Think for example of the peace process in 
Colombia 2016 where a (albeit thin) majority voted “no” in the referendum for a peace 
settlement with the guerrilla (Miroff, 2016). This should be especially true if a minority 
group demands big political concessions. Third, there must be no outside “patron” with 
interests in keeping the conflict going. This patron could simply be a neighbouring country 
but also a minority’s “homeland” situated further away.  
 The channel of credible commitments could be especially pertinent when we consider 
quality of government. Lapuente and Rothstein (2014) found that the separation of politics 
and administration, “the degree to which politicians control bureaucratic careers” (Boräng, 
Cornell, Grimes and Schuster, 2017:10), could explain why, in the late 19th and beginning 
of the 20th century, Spain fell into civil war while Sweden, faced with a similar situation, 
managed to peacefully solve the conflict. Sweden had created a meritocratic and 
autonomous bureaucracy that prevented politicians, in an impartial way, from offering 
public offices to their supporters (among other things). Spain, contrarily, had a patronage-
based administration intimately linked to politics that let politicians appoint and promote 
state officials and thus gain control of the bureaucracy. In the Spanish case, the incumbents 
could not make credible commitments that they would not use state power to discriminate 
against the opposition in terms of depriving them of protection (by law) or by stripping 
them of employment, and so on. In other words, administrations in Spain did not adhere 
to the principle of procedural impartiality, which constitutes quality of government. 
 This is paramount for the propensity of internal conflict because in the case where the 
administration is politicised, in order to keep their jobs, political appointees and public 
administrators supportive of the incumbents have strong incentives for keeping their party 
in power and there will be high pressures to survive at any costs (Lapuente and Rothstein, 
2014:1425). Office-holders have incentives to do everything to maximise their monopoly of 
public offices in different administrations because more control is always better for them 
and their party. For the same reasons, we should expect clientilism, favouritism and indeed 
clear violations of civil liberties. 
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 This might not be an unreasonable expectation. The politicisation of governmental 
administrations has been shown to have consequences also in other fields. For instance, it 
is connected to the production of policy knowledge and politicians’ ability to make credible 
public goods promises in elections (Boräng, Cornell, Grimes and Schuster, 2014). 
Anderson and Tverdova (2003) have furthermore found that those that support the 
incumbents are more likely to be beneficiaries of goods handed out by corrupt public 
officials. 
 To conclude, commitment problems seem to constitute one of the more pertinent 
explanations for connecting quality of government to internal conflict. It could for instance 
plausibly explain why different ethnic groups may clash if one ethnic group controls the 
public administration while other ones are at its mercy. 
3.4.1 First expectation 
In the theoretical discussion in section 3, I have put forward a definition of quality of 
government followed by three sets of theoretical arguments that in the literature explain 
how institutions on the output side of the political system can be linked to internal conflict. 
The first set focuses on how institutions may shrink the opportunity space of the conflict; 
the second set indicates how institutions may help solve grievances between societal 
groups; the third set posits that institutions may affect whether political actors can credible 
commit to political settlements –which could eventually lead to conflict. 
 We can thus render the following expectation, which I will test in the analysis: 
H1: Higher quality of government decreases internal conflict. 
3.5 Ethnic division’s interaction with quality of government 
There are a few reasons for which ethnic divisions are worth taken into consideration when 
we assess quality of government’s effect on internal conflict. There is much research that 
links ethnic divisions of some kind to the grievances and commitment problems that I have 
just described above.  
 In general, societies tend to divide along multiple lines, one of which is ethnicity 
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010). More specifically however, political and economic power 
may also be distributed according to these societal divisions (Horowitz, 1993; 
McCauley, 2016). This means in practice that grievances, opportunity problems, and 
commitment problems also often fall along ethnic lines (Denny and Walter, 2014). Even 
when the core problems are in essence unrelated to ethnicity, (e.g. economic inequality 
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may be the “real problem”), the conflict may take an “ethnic shape” because involved 
actors perceive ethnicity to be a distinguishable divider that can be used to tell one group 
from another (Kirschner, 2010; Ray and Esteban, 2017). 
 Ethnicity may be intimately linked to conflict. There are studies indicating that ethnic 
alliances have advantages over class alliances when it comes to conflict mobilisation 
(Esteban and Ray, 2008) and ethnic allegiances are an especially strong factor in civil wars 
(Kaufmann 1996). In fact, if a civil war begins, it is more likely to have been started by an 
ethnic group than any other kind of group, the reason being that ethnic groups are more 
likely to have grievances against the state (Cederman et al., 2010; Denny and Walter, 2014).  
 Several arguments are advanced by scholars why ethnicity is such an important factor. 
For one, ethnic nationalism is viewed as one the leading sources of group cohesion 
(Murshed, 2002; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Ethnic groups also tend to live together for 
various reasons and share both language and customs so if there is a perceived injustice, 
these groups mobilise support relatively easy. Furthermore, ethnic identity is less elastic 
than other types of identities (Denny and Walter, 2014). It is thus hard to go from thinking 
and feeling in terms of “we, the ethnic group” to “we, everyone in the country”. The 
consequences of fixed identities could be particularly noticeable in those cases where one 
ethnic group is likely to go from being a minority to a majority in relation to another 
ethnic group. Because of changing demographics, one group will lose relative power and 
this may create commitment problems. The soon-to-be minority may hesitate on whether 
it is included in the considerations of the majority and instead resort non-pacific solutions. 
 This argument is, however, dependent on how identifiable people are with a particular 
ethnic group. It also depends on the history between groups and whether atrocities have 
been committed before (Kirschner, 2010). When bringing in public bureaucracies in this 
context, Saideman et al (2002:107) comment that there is often a fear that even a relatively 
neutral government will fall into the hands of one ethnic group which can later dominate 
other groups. This points to the importance of impartial government organisations, such as 
bureaucracy. 
 We can infer ethnicity’s importance to quality of government because QoG operates in 
a context where ethnicity is intertwined with many, if not most, aspects of political and 
social life (Berman et al., 2004; Boone, 2014; Eifert et al., 2010; Posner, 2005). With respect 
to the observation that political and economic power may be distributed along ethnic lines, 
we would expect the presence of ethnic political parties along with ethnic voting (an 
assertion supported by Berman et al., 2004; Boone, 2014; Eifert et al., 2010; Horowitz, 2014; 
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Posner, 2005). The possible link between ethnic parties and quality of government becomes 
evident when we consider the large literature on party patronage. Party patronage (the 
ability of political parties to appoint individuals to positions in the public and semi-public 
sector) is widespread in the world and remains an important electoral resource (Kopecky et 
al., 2016). This has been shown not least in Latin America where the distribution networks 
for most government services involve links between political parties, national legislators 
and public bureaucracies (Barbara, 1994). On the one hand, bureaucracies play a big part 
for the patron because employment and appointments in the organisation are used as a 
political resource by parties, executives and legislators. On the other hand, because 
appointments are made on the basis of loyalty instead of merit, party patronage has 
consequences for the bureaucracy’s ability to produce relevant output. 
 In a situation where the political power has been distributed along ethnic lines, I 
assume that there are strong incentives for the winning ethnic party to reward its voters. 
Governmental and semi-public organisations would be one instrument to achieve this, 
through appointments, patronage jobs, allocations and service-delivery. This development 
would clearly be to the disadvantage of quality of government. 
 This idea that ethnicity may interact with political institutions is present in the 
literature in way or another. Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008:186) write: 
Our argument […] builds on the assumption that dominant cleavages within a country mitigate the 
possible effects that political rules exert on the political competition within a society. 
Schneider and Wiesehomeier envisage institutions as “rules of the game” but I find it 
plausible that the same applies for public bureaucracy, especially when considering 
research like Kyriacou (2013) that finds that socio-economic inequalities between ethnic 
groups affects governance. Some of the reasons would be that members from the less 
wealthy group engage in corruption due to perceived illegitimate rules. Public officials may 
also misallocate resources without being held accountable as long as they redistribute some 
to the less wealthy. 
 Other research suggests that the level of ethnic heterogeneity in a society has 
consequences for how the state apparatus perform and what kind of policies that are 
produced (La Porta et al., 1999). In heterogenous societies, it is not uncommon that the 
ethnic group that wins power in elections shapes policies to expropriate and restrict the 
freedom of the ethnic losers. They may also limit the availability of public goods to certain 
groups in order to weaken the opposition (ibid). This basically translates to “partiality” and 
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once again indicates that the principle of impartiality might be more difficult to uphold in 
ethnically divided polities.  
 In theory, impartial government should lead to no ethnic favouritism. Ahlerup, 
Thushyanthan and Bigsten (2016:56), in a study of impartiality’s effect on economic 
growth, state that: 
It is plausible that an impartial government is also rational and efficient in terms of policy choice. An 
impartial approach to government may also be associated with secure property rights and equality of 
opportunity, that is, also no ethnic favouritism. 
However, we saw from La Porta et al. that heterogenous societies produce policies that do 
not favour the opposition. It would thus seem that we have two opposing forces, in this 
view. One that draws towards partiality and another towards impartiality. 
3.5.1 Second expectation 
In section 3.5, I have linked ethnic division to quality of government. Ethnic divisions are 
consequential for internal conflict as they may increase the opportunity space, escalate 
grievances and constrain political actors to credibly commit to peaceful resolution. Ethnic 
divisions can be tied more distinctly to quality of government through ethnic parties and 
ethnic voting – which, through party patronage, may be associated with a weaker state 
apparatus and discriminative policies towards the political opposition. We therefore expect 
the following: 
H2: More ethnic division reduces quality of government’s effect on internal conflict. 
4. Data and methods 
To test my hypotheses, I will use data on institutional quality, internal conflict and ethnic 
division; the unit of analysis will be countries. This data is collected from several sources, 
the most important ones being the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, ACLED, 
(Raleigh et al., 2010), The QoG Expert Survey (Dahlström et al., 2015), The QoG Standard 
Dataset 2017 (Teorell et al., 2017) and finally Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s (2005) Ethnic 
polarisation index. I refer the reader to appendix A for a more complete overview and 
explanation of all the variables used in this thesis. Appendix C presents descriptive 
statistics. 
 I will use OLS regression and different models, some of which will include an 
interaction effect between quality of government and ethnic division. A main issue with 
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this data is a low number of observations. The number drops rapidly when several variables 
are put in the same model. The variables measuring quality of government and conflict are 
those that primarily limit the analysis in this view. At the same time, there are not many 
alternatives available and that is why I have chosen to go ahead with the analysis. Because 
of the low number of valid observations, close to 30, I have been forced to choose my 
control variables with great care, based on previous research. The data on conflict is from 
2017 and the rest from between 2012 and 2016. 
4.1 Predictor: quality of government 
To measure quality of government, I will rely on data from the QoG Expert Survey 
(Dahlström et al., 2015) which focuses on the organisational design of public bureaucracies 
and bureaucratic behaviour. I will use variable q2_a that measures the extent of meritocratic 
recruitment to public bureaucracy in countries around the globe. More specifically, the survey 
question was formulated in the following manner: 
When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job. 
Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with this statement on a 7-point scale, where 
higher number stands for more meritocratic bureaucracy. Given the fact that meritocratic 
bureaucracy has been found to be correlated with lower corruption (Dahlstrom et al., 2012; 
Evans and Rauch, 1999), this measurement is an adequate proxy for impartiality.  
 In the robustness check, I use an alternative measurement for quality of government, 
namely, the International Country Risk Guide’s Indicator of Quality of Government. This variable 
combines measurements of corruption, law and order and bureaucratic quality. Even 
though, strictly speaking, this variable is not a measurement of impartiality alone, it is still 
a widely used variable in the literature for measuring governmental quality (e.g., Campos 
et al., 2017; Salnikova, 2015; Svallfors, 2013). 
4.2 Outcome variable: low-intensity, internal conflict 
Internal conflict will be measured in two ways. I will use violence against civilians (which 
includes shootings, torture, rape, mutilation, kidnapping and disappearances) and riots and 
protests (riots are violent demonstrations, involving spontaneous action by unorganised, 
unaffiliated members of society), both coming from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
Project, ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010). ACLED has conflict data on Africa, South Asia, 
South East Asia and the Middle East and in practice this means data on developing or in 
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rare cases newly industrialised countries. Using two dependent variables will act as a 
robustness check for quality of government’s effects. These variables are however count 
data. It is therefore possible that a given country has more conflict simply because the 
population is larger. If we do not address this, the results would be skewed towards more 
conflict in more populated countries. I therefore divide the count data by the country’s 
population and get violence against civilians per capita and riots and protests per capita. 
 These variables are, finally, transformed using natural logarithm in order to address 
the linearity assumption for OLS regressions.  
4.3 Interaction variable: ethnic division 
The data for measuring ethnic division comes from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). 
Their “RQ index”, ethnic polarisation, is my primary measurement of ethnic division. 
 Some scholars have pointed out that conflicts such as civil war are group conflicts, not 
conflicts between individuals, and that we therefore should look at polarisation (inequality 
between groups) instead of inequality between individuals (Østby, 2008:144). Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol join this group of scholars and indicate that some countries are highly 
fractionalised without having large amount of conflicts. In fact, a highly fractionalised 
country can score very low on polarisation. 
 The polarisation index measures the distance of ethnic groups from the bipolar case. If 
we have three ethnic groups in a given country and merge two of them into a common 
group (leaving us with only two groups), polarisation will increase. This index thus 
captures the idea that a large minority is the worst possible scenario. The rationale behind 
this is that ethnic groups in a highly fractionalised country may have greater coordination 
problems which should diminish the likelihood for conflict. A large minority, however, 
should find it easier to mobilise and coordinate and consequently increase its relative 
power. 
 I will use ethnic fractionalisation (Alesina et al., 2003) as a robustness check, as this is one of 
the most widely used measures of ethnic division in the literature (Reynal-Querol, 2005). 
4.4 Control variables 
Based on previous research, I identify several control variables to include in the analysis to 
avoid bias in the estimates. As mentioned in section 2.1, a lot of previous research on 
internal conflict has focused on civil war. Many of the control variables are therefore also 
linked to civil war. This does not, however, always prevent them from being useful in other 
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contexts and other types of conflicts. Urbanisation and youth bulges are for example often 
connected to “social conflict” in the literature which not necessarily means civil war but 
rather, it can imply all sorts of acts of violence (e.g., violent robbery or murder), resulting 
from socioeconomic conditions that drive citizens to despair. In the same view, low state 
reach, which is thought to be a consequence of large and rugged countries, should certainly 
imply problems for the government to control rebel groups, but it should in a similar 
manner imply problems for the national police to prevent for example kidnappings and 
rape. 
 Hegre and Sambanis did a sensitivity analysis in 2006 of no less than 88 different 
variables on the onset of civil war and found some variables to perform more consistent 
than others. These variables are: large population, low per capita income, low rates of 
economic growth, recent political instability, inconsistent democratic institutions, countries 
with small militaries, countries with rough terrain and finally countries located in war-prone 
regions. In my main models, I will include measurements of some of these variables. I will 
then, as a robustness check, switch some of them. 
 I refer to appendix B for a complete overview of the control variables and their 
relationship with internal conflict. Appendix D explains data transformation that was done 
for some of the measures. The remainder of this section shortly presents each control 
variable. 
 Economic development. Numerous studies link economic development or growth to 
civil war (Conor Devitt and Tol, 2012; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Henderson, 2000; 
Holtermann, 2012; Krause and Suzuki, 2005), I therefore include L GDP per capita to control 
for this. The variable is transformed by natural logarithm to make it more normally 
distributed. 
 Past conflict. In order to take the conflictual context into account, I will include violent 
conflicts in 2016. Today, reoccurring civil wars are a bigger problem than completely new 
ones (Collier and Sambanis, 2002; Uzonyi and Hanania, 2017; Walter, 2015). Past conflict 
might influence whether new ones occur because people have the previous conflict fresh in 
mind. 
 Political stability. Studies furthermore point to political stability’s role in keeping 
society integrated and upholding state legitimacy. This has been found to be a relevant 
predictor of civil war. Indeed, political instability increases the probability of civil war onset 
(Alesina et al., 1996; Bjorvatn and Reza Farzanegan, 2015; Diouma Bah, 2014; Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Maoz, 1992; O’Rourke, 2017; Pervez Memon et al., 2011; Schumacher, 2013). 
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To control for this, I include years without major political change in my models. This variable is 
Polity IV’s persist variable (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2017) which counts the years a 
polity has persisted without a change in polity components such as “openness of executive 
recruitment” and “executive constraints”. 
 Inconsistent democratic institutions. Regarding political regimes, the highest 
frequency of internal conflicts is observed in semi-democracies. A regime’s political 
structure constrains or facilitates the political behaviour of its inhabitants. This may affect 
opportunities for either peaceful or violent collective action (Ellingsen and Gleditsch, 1997; 
Hegre et al.,2001; Muller and Weede,1990; Vreeland, 2008). I will control for this by 
introducing polity is an anocracy which is based on Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers’ (2017) polity 
variable. I categorise countries in a similar way as Buhaug (2006), which means that 
anocracies are regimes that score from -5 to 5 on the polity scale. These countries are given 
the value 1. All other countries are given the value 0. 
 Large countries. Country size is another factor that has been found relevant for 
explaining internal conflict (Buhaug, 2006; Bleaney and Dimico, 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Possible reasons are that large countries have difficulties in 
projecting power over long distances or that governance becomes more difficult because of 
the extra layers of authority that is needed to control the population in large countries. I 
include a control for this, L Land area, which is a natural logarithm. 
 Rough terrain. Continuing the geographical track, the disposition of the terrain may 
also matter. Rugged or mountainous terrain are significant for the onset and duration of 
civil war in several studies (Bleaney and Dimico, 2011; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009; 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Jimenez-Ayora and Ulubaşoğlu, 2015). Just as with country size, 
the terrain may make it difficult for the state to project its power. This type of terrain can 
serve as a sanctuary for dissident groups and as a base for revenue raising. This type of 
terrain is also linked to difficulties in creating polities in which cooperation is facilitated. 
Terrain ruggedness index is included to check for this (Nunn and Puga, 2012). 
 Natural resources. High-value natural resources (e.g., oil and gemstones) are 
associated with many armed conflicts and secessionist movements and this is often 
denoted as a “conflict curse”. Between 40 and 60 percent of today’s intrastate conflicts can 
be linked to natural resources (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009; 
Rustad and Binningsbø, 2010; Rustad and Binningsbø, 2012; Lujala and Rustad, 2012). The 
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resources might be the motivation itself for the conflict, but they may also constitute 
funding that increases the opportunity for conflict through purchases of weapons and 
recruitment. Some models include oil rents (World Bank, 2016) to control for this.  
 Young population. As for as demography is concerned, this can be linked to social 
conflict via a phenomenon called youth bulges. I measure this by the share of young males in 
population. Looking at the civil conflicts (causing 25 deaths or more) from the seventies until 
the turn of the century, 80 percent of these occurred in countries in which at least 60 
percent of the population is below the age of 30. When compared to countries that have a 
mature population structure, studies observe that the countries having a very young 
structure are three times more likely to experience civil conflict (Ginges, 2005; Karakaya, 
2015; Leahy et al., 2012; Marcus, Islam and Moloney, 2008; Rivera, 2010; Urdal, 2006). 
Developing countries often undergo a demographic transformation that increases the 
proportion of youths. This connects to social conflict because the fast growth rate in the 
working-age population often exacerbates unemployment and worsens the social-
economic status. This, in turn, may incentivise young people to join conflictful 
movements. 
 Urbanisation. Finally, urban conflict in global Southern cities is of increasing concern 
to scholars. Urban centres represent critical arenas in which violent conflict occurs. This is 
linked to the urbanisation of poverty, inadequate infrastructure and governance (Büscher, 
2018; Beall, Goodfellow and Rodgers, 2013; Hinds, 2014; Lombard, 2012; Maninger, 2000). 
Urbanisation entails competition over access to resources and civic conflict is often 
associated with inherent urban qualities such as population density, diversity and 
compressed inequality – often in combination with ethnic strife. I will control for this by 
including an agglomeration index, which is a measure of urbanisation. 
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5. Analysis 
The analysis is organised in two larger sections. One in which low intensive, internal 
conflict is measured as violence against civilians and another in which it is measured as 
riots and protests. In each section, I comment on the regression’s diagnostics for the sake 
of compliance with the OLS assumptions and I thereafter present the results of numerous 
models. Appendices E and F show detailed information about the regression diagnostics. 
 We shall begin the analysis by looking at figures 5.1 to 5.4 below. As can be seen in the 
first two figures, there is linearity between the independent and dependent variables, 
although the relationship is clearly weaker when QoG is measured by meritocratic recruitment. 
Regarding riots and protests (figure 5.3 and 5.4), it is hard to discern a linear relationship 
when QoG is measured as meritocratic recruitment. The relationship that do exist is extremely 
low (0.020) and furthermore goes in the opposite direction as far as hypothesis 1 is 
concerned. However, when looking at figure 5.4 where QoG is measured by ICRG’s index, 
a linear relationship is discernible and it runs in the predicted direction, although 4 cases to 
the upper right obviously affect the fitted line which at the moment is nearly horizontal. 
Figure 5.1 Linearity check  
Meritocratic recruitment vs L violence against civilians  
Figure 5.2 Linearity check 
ICRG QoG vs L violence against civilians 
 
 
 
   
Figure 5.3 Linearity check 
Meritocratic recruitment vs L riots and protests  
Figure 5.4 Linearity check 
ICRG QoG vs L riots and protests 
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5.1 Part 1: Violence against civilians 
Regression diagnostics 
As far as the OLS assumptions are concerned, some are met with more ease than others. As 
can be seen in appendix E, collinearity poses no problems. No variable has a Pearson’s R 
close to the threshold for high correlation, 0.8 (Field, 2013:325) and the VIF values are only 
high when the interaction term is included in the model, which is normal. 
 Most problematic is the assumption of normal distribution of errors. In large samples 
this is not a problem thanks to the central limit theorem but due to my small N, this is an 
issue. The P–P plot (figure E.4) suggests that there is a deviation from normality too far 
from what might be deemed acceptable – and this despite having taken measures to 
minimise this problem, for example taking the natural logarithm of variables with long 
tails. On the other hand, both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk tests 
indicate that the errors are normally distributed. Field (2013) state that in small samples, it 
is tricky to establish whether there is normality one way or another so after having taken 
measures to try to address this issue, as well as having the support of the Shapiro-Wilk test, 
I allow this issue to pass. 
  Figure E.3 in appendix E furthermore indicates that the residuals are not 
homoscedastic. The solution to this is to include a model with robust standard errors 
(model 8 to 10). 
 Finally, quite a few Cook’s D values are high and thus suggest that they are more 
influential than is preferable. Since it is not obvious what to do with outliers, I will content 
myself with including models 9 and 10 that have the most influential outliers removed: 
Indonesia, Israel and Somalia. In any case, I cannot remove all observations with high 
Cook’s D values since there would be below 20 cases left for the regressions. 
 Let us now turn to the regression results. Please note that two asterisks denote the 0.05 
level of significance (p ≤ 0.05), and one asterisk denotes the 0.1 level of significance 
(p ≤ 0.1). 
Model results 
Table 5.1 presents models 1 to 10 which includes a first set of control variables. The last 
models have robust standard errors.  
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Table 5.1 Multiple OLS Meritocratic recruitment DV: “L violence against civilians per capita” 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
       Interaction Robust standard errors 
Outliers removed 
& robust st. errors 
Outliers removed 
& robust st. errors 
Meritocratic 
recruitment 
-.709** 
(.345) 
-.724** 
(.352) 
-.700* 
(.350) 
-.842** 
(.352) 
-.822** 
(.376) 
-.845** 
(.379) 
-.037 
(1.437) 
-.845** 
(.346) 
-.670*** 
(.257) 
.317 
(.763) 
Ethnic Polarisation  -.449 (1.165) 
-.429 
(1.158) 
-.860 
(1.158) 
-.847 
(1.181) 
-.790 
(1.190) 
3.686 
(7.764) 
-.790 
(.881) 
-.815 
(.790) 
4.597 
(3.826) 
Interaction Merit. 
recr. & Ethn. polar.       
-1.308 
(2.241)   
-1.577 
(1.139) 
L GDP per Capita   -.264 (.226) 
-.394 
(.234) 
-.397 
(.239) 
-.474* 
(.258) 
-.504* 
(.266) 
-.474 
(.330) 
-.159 
(.204) 
-.198 
(.197) 
Years without major 
political change    
.060 
(.037) 
.061 
(.038) 
.066 
(.039) 
.072* 
(.041) 
.066** 
(.0298) 
.004 
(.044) 
.011 
(.044) 
L Land area     042 (.238) 
.108 
(.253) 
.155 
(.268) 
.108 
(.256) 
.192 
(.152) 
.260* 
(.149) 
Percentage of 
young males in 
population 
     -.404 (.493) 
-.409 
(.499) 
-.404 
(.633) 
.290 
(.549) 
.263 
(.581) 
Constant -11.226*** (1.251) 
-10.926*** 
(1.488) 
-9.086*** 
(2.160) 
-7.840** 
(2.238) 
-8.432* 
(4.064) 
-4.993 
(5.854) 
-8.162 
(8.040) 
-4.993 
(6.162) 
-14.989** 
(5.573) 
-18.795*** 
(5.731) 
R2 .120 .124 .164 .235 .236 .256 .266 – – – 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 30 30 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. The significance value for meritocratic recruitment in model 3 is 0.055. 
The first thing to notice is that the R2 value starts at .120 in model 1 and finishes at .266 in 
model 7. It’s normal that the values increase since more variables are included in the 
models. Model 7 thus accounts for 27 % of the variation in L violence against civilians per capita. 
Following Falk and Miller (1992) who consider R2 values greater than .10 to be adequate, I 
deem these models’ R2 values to be satisfactory.  
 The second thing to notice is that although almost all control variables are 
insignificant, meritocratic recruitment remains significant in all models but those including the 
interaction variable (in model 3 at the 90% level). Since there is heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals, model 8 to 10 are of special interest. Even when using robust standard errors in 
model 8, the coefficient of meritocratic recruitment (-.845) remains significant and negative. 
This is a good indication for hypothesis 1 which expected a negative sign. Since the 
dependent variable is a natural logarithm, it is difficult to interpret the coefficient right 
from the table. But by applying the formula 100(eβ1-1), we get the change in percent in Y. In 
other words, one unit’s change on the 7-point scale of meritocratic recruitment (model 8) results 
in a 57 % decrease in violence against civilians per capita. In the robustness check 1 (see appendix 
G) where ethnic polarisation is replaced with ethnic fractionalisation, there is no major changes in 
the coefficients for meritocratic recruitment. One control, L GDP per Capita, also becomes 
significant in some models. 
 To sum up, the data provide support for H1 and the effect of quality of government 
appears be quite substantial when controlling for economic development, political stability, 
country size and population youth. Quality of government, by helping to address 
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commitment problems and grievances, may thus have a real impact on the levels of 
violence in a given development country. 
 However, there are some caveats with this analysis. All but two control variables, years 
without major political change and L GDP per Capita (in some models) are insignificant and the 
same goes for whole model when ANOVA (not reported) is checked. The N is also 
relatively very low. The possible issues with some OLS assumptions, warrant some caution 
when interpreting the results, especially when talking about confidence intervals, 
significance and the generalisability of the sample.  
Outliers and interaction effects 
When the influential outliers are removed, the effect of meritocratic recruitment decreases a 
little bit but remains significant, which again, speaks to the first hypothesis’ advantage but 
on the other hand, it is hard to justify such manipulations of the data, especially if no 
considerable changes can be seen. The only substantial adjustment that we observe when 
the outliers are removed is found in model 10. When the interaction variable is added, the 
coefficient of meritocratic recruitment (.317) changes sign. This would normally be worrisome 
but since the coefficient is insignificant and has a huge standard error (.763), I remain 
assured as to the previous interpretation of the coefficients of meritocratic recruitment.  
 Hypothesis 2 receives no support. In models 7 and 10, using robust standard errors, 
the coefficients for both meritocratic recruitment and ethnic polarisation become or stay 
insignificant when the interaction variable is added. The interaction term itself is also 
insignificant. Simply put, this data does not support hypothesis 2 which expected less effect 
from quality of government in highly polarised societies. 
Robustness checks 
I will now turn to a series of robustness checks. In order to allow for a sufficient number of 
degrees of freedom, I have to restrict the number of maximum variables in analysis, using a 
rule of thumb “5–6 observations per variable”.  I was unable in the main analysis to include 
as many control variables as I wanted to. I will therefore run a few models in which I 
change controls. These will be run without interaction effects. Finally, I will substitute 
meritocratic recruitment with ICRG’s Indicator of Quality of Government. The results are presented in 
tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
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Table 5.2 Meritocratic recruitment and change of controls DV: “L violence against civilians per capita” 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 
     Robust standard errors     
Robust standard 
errors 
Meritocratic 
recruitment 
-.724** 
(.352) 
-.700* 
(.350) 
-.717* 
(.366) 
-.563 
(.399) 
-.563* 
(.311) 
-.700* 
(.350) 
-.748** 
(.361) 
-.561 
(.418) 
-.638 
(.491) 
-.638* 
(.344) 
Ethnic Polarisation -.449 (1.165) 
-.429 
(1.158) 
-.484 
(1.210) 
-.311 
(1.224) 
-.311 
(1.030) 
-.429 
(1.158) 
-.313 
(1.182) 
-.234 
(1.189) 
-.226 
(1.210) 
-.226 
(.701) 
L GDP per Capita  -.264 (.226) 
-.265 
(.230) 
-.260 
(.230) 
-.260 
(.304) 
-.264 
(.226) 
-.029 
(.417) 
-.103 
(.426) 
-.117 
(.436) 
-.117 
(.534) 
Ruggedness   .053 (.262) 
.017 
(.265) 
.017 
(.161)      
At least one conflict 
in 2016    
.553 
(.571) 
.553 
(.495)      
Agglomeration 
index       
-.015 
(.023) 
-.017 
(.023) 
-.016 
(.024) 
-.016 
(.018) 
Oil rents (% of 
GDP)        
.035 
(.039) 
.030 
(.042) 
.030 
(.0299) 
Polity is an 
anocracy         
-.202 
(.643) 
-.202 
(.471) 
Constant -10.926*** (1.488) 
-9.086*** 
(2.160) 
-9.049*** 
(2.205) 
-9.952*** 
(2.396) 
-9.952*** 
(2.304) 
-9.086*** 
(2.160) 
-10.060*** 
(2.617) 
-10.285*** 
(2.638) 
-9.802*** 
(3.093) 
-9.802*** 
(2.805) 
R2 .124 .164 .165 .193 – .164 .177 .201 .204 – 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. Meritocratic recruitment has p=0.055 in model 12 and 16; p=0.060 in model 13; p=0.070 for model 15. 
In table 5.2, we observe lower R2 values compared to previous models.  Model 14 has an R2 
of .193 and model 18 an R2 of .201. Both values are less than model 5’s R2 of .236 (table 5.1) 
despite the fact that all models have the same number of variables and the same cases. This 
means that when I start substituting the control variables in the main regression table 5.1, 
the models explain less variation in L violence against civilians per capita. 
 As in table 5.1, all control variables are insignificant in table 5.2 but more importantly, 
meritocratic recruitment drops its significance too in some models when the original controls 
are replaced (see for example models 14, 18 and 19). This is certainly worth noting, but 
when robust standard errors are used in models 15 and 20, the coefficients are still 
significant at the 90 % confidence level (p ≤ 0.1) for meritocratic recruitment. 
 These results mean that the original relationship we observed in table 5.1, which was 
promising for the first hypothesis, is to some degree dependent on which variables that 
were controlled for. The original results are therefore to some extent put into question and 
this demand caution in the interpretation and certainly when it comes drawing conclusions 
and generalising from the sample to the population.  
 What nonetheless still speaks in favour to the original interpretation which gave 
support to hypothesis 1 is that all coefficients of meritocratic recruitment in models 1 through 9 
and 11 through 20 are negative, as expected. In model 15 for example, the coefficient 
is -.563 which means when controlling for economic development, rugged terrain and 
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previous conflict, each unit’s increase of meritocratic recruitment renders a 43 percent’s decrease 
in violence against civilians per capita.  
 In short, the results in table 5.2 require us to be a bit more conservative in our 
interpretation and conclusion. 
 As a final robustness check, I measure quality of government by ICRG QoG’s index. The 
results are presented in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Multiple OLS with ICRG QoG. DV: “L violence against civilians per capita” 
 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23  Model 24  Model 25 Model 26  Model 27 Model 28 
       Interaction Robust standard errors 
ICRG Indicator of 
Quality of 
Government 
-5.432** 
(2.024) 
-5.421** 
(2.051) 
-5.719** 
(2.639) 
-7.276*** 
(2.554) 
-7.694*** 
(2.673) 
-7.669*** 
(2.739) 
4.868 
(6.980) 
-7.669*** 
(2.887) 
Ethnic Polarisation  -.615 (1.150) 
-.619 
(1.173) 
-1.195 
(1.122) 
-1.272 
(1.143) 
-1.248 
(1.183) 
8.427 
(5.127 
-1.248 
(.792) 
Interaction ICRG 
QoG & Ethn. polar.       
-21.930* 
(11.343)  
L GDP per Capita   .054 (.290) 
-.019 
(.272) 
.008 
(.278) 
-.006 
(.304) 
-.016 
(.287) 
-.006 
(.265) 
Years without major 
political change    
.079** 
(.036) 
.075* 
(.037) 
.075* 
(.038) 
.079** 
(.036) 
.075*** 
(.027) 
L Land area     -.156 (.251) 
-.141 
(.282) 
-.083 
(.268) 
-.141 
(.282) 
Percentage of 
young males in 
population 
     -.062 (.495) 
-.043 
(.467) 
-.062 
(.555) 
Constant -11.435*** (.884) 
-11.103*** 
(1.089) 
-11.376*** 
(1.842) 
-10.479*** 
(1.761) 
-8.424** 
(3.748) 
-7.976 
(5.245) 
-14.358** 
(5.946) 
-7.976* 
(4.554) 
R2 .211 .219 .220 .352 .363 .363 .460 – 
N 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
Table 5.3 is identical to table 5.1 as far as the control variables are concerned. The only 
difference is that meritocratic recruitment is replaced by ICRG QoG. It should be noted that the N 
has dropped to 29 due to ICRG QoG not having values on all the cases that meritocratic 
recruitment does but the R2 of the full models (model 26 and 27) is higher than those in the 
main regression in table 5.1. Model 27 explains 46 percent of the variation in L violence 
against civilians per capita while model 7 (table 5.1) explains 26 percent. 
 A change from previous models is that one control variable, years without major political 
change is significant along with ICRG QoG. In all models but model 27, the coefficient of ICRG 
QoG is negative and significant, often on a higher level of significance than in previous 
models (p-value ≤ 0.01). This also gives support to hypothesis 1, namely that higher quality 
of government decreases low intensity, internal conflict. 
 A major difference in table 5.3 compared to 5.1 is the size of the coefficients. In 
model 8, meritocratic recruitment had a coefficient of -.845** – in model 28 however, ICRG QoG 
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has a coefficient of -7.669***. Again, using the formula 100(eB1-1), this means that when 
ICRG QoG increases by one unit, violence against civilians per capita decreases by 99 percent. This 
effect might seem extraordinary, but we get these results because ICRG QoG is an index that 
runs from 0 to 1. What we see here is thus the coefficient for when we move from a country 
with the worst quality of government (value 0) to a country with the best (on this scale) 
quality of government (value 1). Nonetheless, the effect is in my view remarkable and 
strongly suggests that quality of government is something worth paying attention to in 
internal violence prone countries. 
 As far as hypothesis 2 is concerned, we see in table 5.3 that the interaction term is 
significant on the p ≤ 0.1-level in model 27 and thereby becomes of interest. The second 
hypothesis expected that more ethnic division reduces quality of government’s effect on 
internal conflict. To investigate this further we turn to the margins plot in figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5 Average Marginal effects of ICRG QoG with 95 % CIs 
 
Figure 5.5 depicts how the average marginal effect of ICRG QoG on the outcome variable is 
conditioned by ethnic polarisation, together with the confidence interval. At the value .5 on the 
X-axis, the effect line together with the whole confidence interval is below 0. This means 
that we can say with certainty that when ethnic polarisation has a value of 0.5 and over, the 
utility of ICRG QoG increases. In other words, it is in rather highly polarised societies that 
QoG significantly reduces violence against civilians. These are countries like South Africa, 
Malawi, Sri Lanka and Jordan. 
 As with the main analysis in table 5.1, this data does not support hypothesis 2. The 
hypothesis expected less effect from ICRG QoG as polarisation increases but it turns out to be 
the other way around. This means that even when using ICRG QoG as a different 
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measurement for QoG, one that includes not only bureaucratic quality but also corruption 
and law and order, the data cannot support hypothesis 2. It would also have been 
preferable if ICRG QoG itself and ethnic polarisation were significant in model 27 (not only the 
interaction effect). Instead, they have quite large standard errors. 
Summary 
In general, the data suggests that hypothesis 1 (that higher quality of government decreases 
internal conflict) receive support. This support is nonetheless to a certain degree 
dependent of what is controlled for in the model. The robustness check for the 
independent variable also suggests that hypothesis 1 receive support. Hypothesis 2 (that 
more ethnic division reduces quality of government’s effect on internal conflict) does not 
receive support in neither the main analysis, nor the robustness check. 
 As far as trust in the analysis is concerned, we must be cautious with drawing too big 
conclusions since the data contains a relatively low number of observations. This is 
especially true since different controls affect the coefficient of the independent variable 
somewhat. The low N prevents the inclusion of an adequate number of controls in the 
same model and this is something that substantially limits the analysis and the conclusions 
that can be drawn from it. 
5.2 Part 2: Riots and protests 
The second part of the analysis changes the outcome variable from L violence against civilians 
per capita to L riots and protests per capita and is also thought of as a robustness check for the 
previous analysis. The following models will follow the same pattern as before, using the 
same sets of controls. 
Regression diagnostics 
Appendix F shows the regression diagnostics for model 35, that is, the full model of 
table 5.4. I should briefly mention that, again, there are possible influential outliers and 
issues with normality of errors and heteroscedasticity. The heteroscedasticity is however 
not as bad as in previous models (table 5.1). In any case, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests deem the residuals as normally distributed on this occasion too. When 
the outliers are removed, the issue of normality of errors disappears completely. The OLS 
assumptions are however not the main issue with these models. We remember figure 5.3 
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that showed a very weak positive relationship between meritocratic recruitment and L riots and 
protests per capita. This goes against hypothesis 1 from the beginning and a further analysis 
should not be needed. I have despite this included table 5.4 and I will briefly comment on it 
before moving on to the alternative measurement of quality of government which is the 
reason for including L riots and protests per capita in the analysis.  
Model results 
Table 5.4 is basically the same regressions as in the first main regression table (5.1) but with 
L riots and protests capita as outcome variable. 
Table 5.4 Multiple OLS with Meritocratic recruitment DV: “L riots and protests per capita” 
 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 
       Interaction Robust standard errors 
Outliers removed 
& robust st. errors 
Outliers removed 
& robust st. errors 
Meritocratic 
recruitment 
.112 
(.367) 
.158 
(.366) 
.144 
(.373) 
.213 
(.388) 
.182 
(.414) 
.189 
(.422) 
.980 
(1.606) 
.189 
(343) 
.015 
(.2857) 
-.687 
(1.0844) 
Ethnic Polarisation  1.513 (1.216) 
1.490 
(1.235) 
1.700 
(1.279) 
1.682 
(1.302) 
1.655 
(1.327) 
6.035 
(8.683) 
1.655* 
(.963) 
1.764*** 
(.6831) 
-1.910 
(4.9571) 
Interaction Merit. 
recr. & Ethn. polar.       
-1.280 
(2.507)   
1.106 
(1.4972) 
L GDP per Capita   .083 (.217) 
.178 
(.256) 
.183 
(.261) 
.215 
(.288) 
.186 
(.297) 
.215 
(.261) 
.139 
(.2382) 
.144 
(.2357) 
Years without major 
political change    
-.025 
(.034) 
-.027 
(.036) 
-.027 
(.037) 
-.022 
(.039) 
-.027 
(.039) 
.024 
(.0287) 
.022 
(.0281) 
L Land area     -.065 (.263) 
-.090 
(.282) 
-.045 
(.300) 
-.090 
(.385) 
-.285 
(.2570) 
-.301 
(.2589) 
Young males in 
population      
.151 
(.540) 
.146 
(.547) 
.151 
(.535) 
.055 
(.4232) 
.029 
(.4140) 
Constant -12.992*** (1.336) 
-13.994*** 
(1.550) 
-14.542*** 
(2.131) 
-15.406*** 
(2.460) 
-14.484 
(4.488) 
-15.782** 
(6.500) 
-18.881** 
(8.960) 
-15.782*** 
(5.459) 
-11.602*** 
(4.4179) 
-8.826 
(6.5382) 
R2 .003 .050 .055 .071 .074 .076 .085 – – – 
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 31 31 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
In models 29 through 38, meritocratic recruitment remains insignificant as do all the controls 
variables. Only in model 36 and 37 when the outliers Rwanda, Tunisia and United Arab 
Emirates are removed does ethnic polarisation become significant and then on a high level 
(p-value ≤ 0.01). Regarding meritocratic recruitment, it has a positive coefficient in all models 
but the last one (model 38). When the outliers are removed and robust standard errors are 
used, it becomes positive – but it also has a huge standard error and it is pointless to draw 
any conclusions from this. 
 The main takeaway from these models is that the data cannot give support to either 
hypothesis 1 or 2. I get the same results when using different controls (see appendix H for 
this). I will now instead turn to the alternative measurement of quality of government. 
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Robustness checks 
In figure 5.4 we saw, by eyeballing, that there could plausibly be a negative relationship 
between ICRG QoG and L riots and protests per capita. This is the reason for which L riots and 
protests per capita still is interesting for this analysis. I will now run a set of regressions in the 
same manner that I have done previously. Starting with the original set of controls and 
then replacing them by others. The results are shown in tables 5.5 and 5.6. 
Table 5.5 Multiple OLS ICRG QoG DV: “L riots and protests per capita” 
 Model 39 Model 40  Model 41  Model 42  Model 43 Model 44  Model 45 Model 46  
       Interaction Robust standard errors 
ICRG Indicator of 
Quality of 
Government 
-.064 
(2.034) 
-.124 
(2.045) 
-.870 
(2.775) 
-.389 
(2.906) 
-1.519 
(2.921) 
-1.814 
(2.924) 
8.058 
(7.736) 
-1.814 
(2.833) 
Ethnic Polarisation  1.054 (1.213) 
1.034 
(1.233) 
1.219 
(1.280) 
1.012 
(1.253) 
.776 
(1.268) 
8.414 
(5.696) 
.776 
(.916) 
Interaction ICRG 
QoG & Ethn. polar.       
-17.331 
(12.611)  
L GDP per Capita   .117 (.289) 
.173 
(.305) 
.242 
(.300) 
.376 
(.324) 
.372 
(.318) 
.376 
(.305) 
Years without major 
political change    
-.022 
(.034) 
-.035 
(.034) 
-.037 
(.034) 
-.031 
(.034) 
-.037 
(.037) 
L Land area     -.427 (.276) 
-.563* 
(.303) 
-.515 
(.299) 
-.563* 
(.292) 
Percentage of 
young males in 
population 
     .560 (.522) 
.563 
(.512) 
.560 
(.547) 
Constant -12.496*** (.908) 
-13.050*** 
(1.112) 
-13.605*** 
(1.775) 
-14.135*** 
(1.977) 
-8.505** 
(4.112) 
-12.618** 
(5.611) 
-17.611** 
(6.597) 
-12.618** 
(5.807) 
R2 .000 .027 .033 .049 .135 .177 .242 – 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
The full model (45) explains 24 percent of the variation in L riots and protests per capita which 
is less than the previous full models (7 and 27). More important, however, is the fact that 
ICRG QoG‘s coefficient has a negative sign throughout all the models (except model 45) but 
they are all insignificant and has huge standard errors. Using robust standard errors does 
not help either. The negative coefficients would have given further support to hypothesis 1 
but the large standard errors mean that we cannot trust the coefficients and thus not give 
support to the hypotheses. The same thing applies to hypothesis 2 since the interaction 
term also is insignificant. 
 Before proceeding further with commenting on the consequences of these results, let 
us take a look at table 5.6 which shows the same changes of controls that was used earlier. I 
remind that the main analysis (tables 5.1 and 5.2) showed that the outcome of the 
regressions (and the coefficients of meritocratic recruitment) where to a certain degree 
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dependent on which controls that were included in the models. I therefore test the same 
thing with L riots and protests per capita. 
Table 5.6 ICRG QoG and change of controls. DV: “L riots and protests per capita” 
 Model 47 Model 48 Model 49 Model 50 Model 51 Model 52 Model 53 Model 54 Model 55 Model 56 
     Robust standard errors     
Robust standard 
errors 
ICRG Indicator of 
Quality of 
Government 
-.124 
(2.045) 
-.870 
(2.775) 
-1.874 
(2.946) 
-1.817 
(3.131) 
-1.817 
(2.342) 
-.870 
(2.775) 
-.813 
(2.841) 
-3.801 
(3.235) 
-4.172 
(3.269) 
-4.172* 
(2.196) 
Ethnic Polarisation 1.054 (1.213) 
1.034 
(1.233) 
.731 
(1.268) 
.743 
(1.306) 
.743 
(1.120) 
1.034 
(1.233) 
.993 
(1.271) 
1.006 
(1.223) 
1.080 
(1.229) 
1.080 
(.979) 
L GDP per Capita  .117 (.289) 
.118 
(.289) 
.116 
(.296) 
.116 
(.240) 
.117 
(.289) 
.044 
(.455) 
.420 
(.489) 
.335 
(.499) 
.335 
(.271) 
Ruggedness   .514 (.507) 
.508 
(.524) 
.508 
(.312)      
At least one conflict 
in 2016    
.039 
(.602) 
.039 
(4397)      
Agglomeration 
index       
.005 
(.024) 
.008 
(.023) 
.012 
(.024) 
.012 
(.017) 
Oil rents (% of 
GDP)        
-.067 
(.039) 
-.073 
(.040) 
-.073** 
(.031) 
Polity is an 
anocracy         
-.561 
(.604) 
-.561 
(.531) 
Constant -13.050*** (1.112) 
-13.605*** 
(1.775) 
-13.490*** 
(1.778) 
-13.522*** 
(1.877) 
-13.522*** 
(1.829) 
-13.605*** 
(1.775) 
-13.285*** 
(2.355) 
-14.680*** 
(2.406) 
-13.782*** 
(2.600) 
-13.782*** 
(1.901) 
R2 .027 .033 .071 .072 – .033 .035 .142 .173 – 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. ICRG QoG has a p-value of 0.057 in model 56. 
For the sake of comparison, models 39 through 46 in table 5.5 had coefficients for ICRG QoG 
that fluctuated between -0.06 and -1.8 (disregarding the positive coefficient). When the 
control variables have been swapped around in models 47 through 56, the coefficients for 
the same variable range between -0.81 and -4.17. This would have been an interesting 
observation since the latter models give larger coefficients but unfortunately, ICRG QoG, as 
well as the controls, are insignificant in this table too. 
 One interesting exception is that in the very last model (56) which uses robust standard 
errors, ICRG QoG has a p-value of .057 and is thus significant. Oil rents also becomes 
significant for the first time in the whole analysis. The coefficient of ICRG QoG in model 56 
is -4.172 and this means that when controlling for ethnic division, economic development, 
urbanisation, natural resources and inconsistent democratic institutions, a one unit’s 
increase in ICRG QoG renders a decrease in riots and protests per capita of 98 percent. 
 This is the only model out of 18 that comes close to significant results and thereby 
gives support to hypothesis 1 when internal conflict is measured by riots and protests and 
quality of government is measured by ICRG’s QoG indicator. It would be too imprudent to 
draw big conclusions from this single model but I would go so far as to say that it certainly 
makes the picture more nuanced and shows that, rather than rejecting hypothesis 1 
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altogether, more research is needed to sort out what has been observed in this analysis. 
Hypothesis 2 has not gained any support at all throughout the whole second part of the 
analysis. 
 On a more general level, the second part of the analysis (5.2) calls the results from the 
first part (5.1) into question. While the first results largely pointed towards giving support 
to the expectation that better quality of government decreases internal conflict, the latter 
results cannot corroborate this at all (except for the last model which I just brought up). 
This suggests that results in studies of internal conflict are highly dependent on how we 
measure internal conflict. I would say that it also shows that studies of this type need more 
precised theorising and thought behind what constitutes a conflict and what kind of 
conflict that is likely or not, to occur in these settings. Additionally, as before, a major 
disadvantage of the second part of the thesis’ analysis is the low N. The results in this thesis 
should therefore be taken as indications rather than firm facts. 
Summary 
In the second part of the analysis, the data cannot give overall support to the hypotheses. 
Only in one single model, using specific controls, does the results point towards what was 
expected in hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 does not receive any support at all using this data. 
Caution is warranted when interpreting the overall results in this thesis since they point in 
opposite directions. 
5.3 Issues of endogeneity 
Endogeneity can be caused for instance by omitted variables, measurement error in the 
independent variable or reversed causality. Reversed causality is an issue that still causes 
uncertainties in the governance and institutions literatures (Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2010) 
and when it comes to internal conflict, some observers have pointed to the fact that it often 
takes a state’s resources to commit serious crimes such as genocide (Saideman et al., 2002). 
Indeed, one’s own government is the greatest potential threat in many countries. 
 Reversed causality in the context of this thesis would mean that it is internal conflict 
that affects the quality of government (i.e. the principle of impartiality). This idea is not 
impossible. It is for example easily imaginable that a civil war with strong ethnic 
undertones or even ethnic cleansing entails consequences in the form of increased 
discrimination of people by ethnicity in the whole society, including in state bureaucracy. 
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There are already some studies on the neighbouring concept of state capacity 
(e.g., Sobek, 2010) that point in this direction of causality. Linke (2013) has furthermore 
found that local experiences with conflict reduce trust in government. This reduced trust 
could potentially make bureaucrats more inclided to give partial treatment further down 
the causality chain. Finally, Wood (2003) has also found that conflict may have a direct 
impact on institutional developments by creating settings in which particular institutions 
grow. Wood’s example is El Salvador and how the conflict adjusted institutions towards the 
demands of the conflict instead of the people. However, since I have been interested in low 
intensity, internal conflict, I consider the risk of reversed causality to be less severe than if 
we were talking about civil war, although the risk is obviously there. 
 Unfortunately, there is not much that can be done to address this problem when using 
cross-sectional data. Other statistical techniques have options like instrumental variable 
analysis but finding a suitable instrument is a challenging task that hardly can be 
accomplished within the timeframe of a MA thesis. 
 An inductive angle to this problem would be to see what other scholars have arrived at. 
This way, I have an indication of the way of causality, compared to knowing nothing. Wig 
and Forø Tollefsen (2016:39) used matching techniques with a view to address this 
problem and their verdict is that “this exercise increases our confidence that there is indeed 
an independent effect of local institutional quality on conflict risk”. Additionally, Hegre 
and Nygård (2015) affronted this problem by using an instrumental variable together with 
a two-step model and found their models to be only moderatly biased. (Their study found a 
reduced risk of renewed conflict in countries with good governance, conceptualised as 
factors from both policy-making and implementation.) Since these scholars found the 
direction of causality to run from QoG to conflict, this at least raises the probability that 
the same applies for my analysis. 
 The best effort I can do to reduce bias is to present several sets of robustness test and I 
believe that I have done that to an adequate extent. This is also what Wig and Forø 
Tollefsen (2016) suggest when no instrumental variable is available. 
 Omitted variable bias is also one of issues linked to the OLS assumptions. We are 
supposed to include all relevant variables in the model, otherwise it will be biased. In 
practise however, it is impossible to fulfil this assumption 100 % – not least because we 
cannot know which all the relevant variables are beforehand. The amount of available data 
also limits how many control variables that, practically, can be included in the models. This 
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is one of the main weaknesses of this analysis. Because of the low N, I cannot include all the 
relevant variables in one single model. The low N also puts limits on the generalisability of 
the sample. 
5.4 Future research 
In 2014, Walter called for future research on what aspects of good governance that are 
important to internal conflict. This thesis has contributed to this call by focusing on the 
aspect of impartiality in governmental bureaucracies. However, the results, while to some 
degree pointing towards the importance of impartiality, rest inconclusive in general. This 
thesis would have benefited greatly from an improvement of the available data and this is 
an important point for future research in this field. 
 First, I agree with Ray and Esteban (2017) in their wish for better and more nuanced 
data on internal conflicts. ACLED has recently added new countries to their dataset and I 
can only encourage them and other scholars to add more data. A distinction between riots 
and protests would probably have helped this analysis since riots lie closer to the concept of 
conflict that I am interested in, than do protests (which are of a more peaceful nature). The 
data for operationalising quality of government could also improve. The QoG Expert 
Survey contains 129 observations for meritocratic recruitment and ACLED has around 69 
observations for its conflict variables. Unfortunately, these datasets rarely have data on the 
same countries and it was primarily these variables that made the N fall towards 30 in the 
regressions. Since (violent) internal conflict to a lesser extent is a problem in the developed 
world but rather, a phenomenon observed in the developing world, improvement of the 
quality of government data for developing or newly industrialised countries would be of 
great benefit to this field of research. 
 A natural next step is finally to do a time-series analysis to estimate quality of 
government’s effect on internal conflict over time – and for that, we certainly need good 
data. 
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6. Conclusion 
I have in this thesis, by looking at developing and newly industrialised countries, 
systematically examined the extent to which quality of government affects low-intensity, 
internal conflict and how this relationship is affected by levels of ethnic division,  
 There are two main findings. First, the data initially suggests that quality of 
government reduces internal conflict. This is consistent with hypothesis 1 and the 
theoretical framework. It is plausible that quality of government, that is, the procedural 
norm of impartiality, is reducing internal conflict by diminishing the opportunity space for 
the conflict, by preventing the onset of grievances between societal groups, and finally by 
making political commitments more credible. 
 These results are however dependent on how one measures conflict. The 
aforementioned results are only valid when conflict is measured as violence against 
civilians, which includes shootings, torture, rape, mutilation, kidnapping and 
disappearances. On the other hand, when conflict is measured as riots and protests, which 
include violent demonstrations and spontaneous action by unorganised, unaffiliated 
members of society, then the first hypothesis only gains support in one model out of 
eighteen. This fact nuances the first analysis and warrants caution when drawing 
conclusions. In short, these results provide an indication that quality of government may 
be of high relevance for internal conflict but in essence, further research is needed on the 
topic. 
 Second, the theoretical framework connects ethnic division to escalating grievances 
and constrained political actors (with regard to credible commitments). The link between 
ethnic division and quality of government could be found for instance in ethnic parties and 
ethnic voting that, in turn, are linked to public bureaucracy through party patronage and 
discriminative policies. The data is however to a large extent inconclusive as to how the 
relationship between quality of government and internal conflict is affected by levels of 
ethnic division, regardless of how one measures ethnic division.  
 In one model, the data suggests that it is in ethnically polarised societies – those where 
the levels of divisions are quite substantial (above 0.5 on the index) – that QoG 
significantly reduces violence against civilians. This single model gives results that are 
opposite from what was expected and it thereby does not give support to the second 
hypothesis. 
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 Although this thesis has produced rather inconclusive results, it is worthwhile to 
mention that the indications that are obtained, namely that quality of government reduces 
low-intensity, internal conflict, still are consistent with the previous literature. Both the 
literature using the somewhat neighbouring concept of “state capacity” and the small 
literature that adopts concepts closer to that of “quality of government” find that this, on 
average, reduces internal conflict. It must be mentioned however, that these literatures 
mostly focus on civil wars. 
 The major weakness of this thesis is the low N. The low number of observations 
(countries in this case) prevents the inclusion of a substantial amount of control variables 
in the same model. Because of this, it was not possible to control for everything (in the 
same model) that previous literature deemed important for internal conflict. As we know, 
it is important to control for everything relevant in order to get correct coefficients and 
correct estimations. This is mainly due to a lack of data to measure quality of government 
and conflict. For future research, I recommend that efforts be made to address this data 
issue. Given the policy relevance and the high stakes for the millions of people that live in 
conflict-affected regions and countries, this issue should arguably be one of the priorities 
for the international research community.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A – All used variables in the analysis 
Table A.1 All used variables in the analysis 
No Phenomenon Measurement Definition From dataset Original source Data from year 
No of 
observations Comment 
1 Quality of government 
Meritocratic 
recruitment 
(q2_a) 
Question: When recruiting public sector employees, the 
skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the 
job. 
QoG  
Expert Survey  
Data 
Dahlström, Teorell, Dahlberg, 
Hartmann, Lindberg and Nistotskaya 
(2015). 
2015 129 
Runs between 1 and 7. Higher 
values indicate higher quality of 
government. 
2 Quality of government 
ICRG Indicator of 
Quality of 
Government 
(icrg_qog) 
The mean value of the ICRG variables: “corruption”, “law 
and order” and “bureaucracy quality”. QoG ICRG (n.d.). 2013 139 
Scaled 0-1. Higher values indicate 
higher quality of government. 
3 Low-intensity, internal conflict 
Violence against 
civilians 
(viol) 
Violent attacks on unarmed civilians. Includes inflicting 
significant harm (e.g. shooting, torture, rape, mutilation, 
etc.) or accosting victims (e.g. kidnapping and dis-
appearances). 
ACLED Raleigh, Linke, Hegre and Karlsen (2010). 2017 67 Count data. 
4 Low-intensity, internal conflict 
Riots and protests 
(riots) 
Riots: violent demonstration, often involving a spont-
aneous action by unorganized, unaffiliated members of 
society. Protests: non-violent demonstrations, involving 
typically unorganized action by members of society. 
ACLED Raleigh, Linke, Hegre and Karlsen (2010). 2017 69 Count data. 
5 Population Population (unna_pop) 
De facto population in a country, area or region as of 1 
July of the year. QoG UN Statistics (2016). 2013 193  
6 Low-intensity, internal conflict  
L Violence against 
civilians per capita 
2017 
(l_viol_cap) 
The quotient of number of violence against civilians and 
population. The variable is then transformed using 
natural logarithm. 
_   66 Becomes continuous data. 
7 Low-intensity, internal conflict 
L Riots and protests 
per capita 2017 
(l_riots_cap) 
The quotient of number of riots and population. The 
variable is then transformed using natural logarithm. _   67 Becomes continuous data. 
8 Ethnic division Ethnic polarisation (ethpol) 
How far the distribution of the ethnic groups is from the 
bipolar distribution (1/2, 0, 0, ... 0, 1/2) which represents 
the highest level of polarisation. The index captures the 
idea that a large minority is the worst possible situation. 
– Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Around 2005 134 
Higher values mean more 
polarisation. 
9 Ethnic division 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
(al_ethnic) 
The probability that two randomly selected people from a 
given country will not share a certain characteristic. The 
definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial 
and linguistic characteristics. 
QoG Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly,  Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003). 2013 186 
Higher values mean more 
fractionalisation. (Less probability of 
two persons sharing characteristics.) 
10 Low income levels L GDP per capita (l_unna_gdppc) 
GDP per capita (current prices in US dollar). Natural 
logarithm. QoG UN Statistics (2016). 2013 193  
11 Past conflict 
Violent conflict in 
2016 
(confl2016) 
Conflict: “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths in a calendar year”. 
UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict 
Dataset 
Allansson, Melander and Themnér 
(2017); Gleditsch and Ward (1999). 2016 194 
Dichotomous.  
0 for “no conflict occurred in 2016”;  
1 for “at least one conflict occurred in 
2016”. 
12 Political instability 
Years without major 
political change 
(persist) 
The number of years the polity has persisted without a 
change in any of the six polity component variables: 
regulation of chief executive recruitment, competitive-
eness of executive recruitment, openness of executive 
recruitment, executive constraints (decision rules), 
regulation of participation, and the competitiveness of 
participation. 
Polity IV Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2017). 2016 164 
Higher number indicates more 
political stability because the polity 
component points have not changed. 
13 
Inconsistent 
democratic 
institutions 
Polity is an 
anocracy 
(anocracy) 
Dummy variable. Indicates whether the polity is an 
anocracy or not. Based on the Polity variable from 
Polity IV, where -10 is fully autocratic and +10 is fully 
democratic. 
Polity IV Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2017). 2016 165 
2 Categories. 
1 Anocracy (values -5 to 5)  
0 Not anocracy (other values). 
14 Country size L Land area  (wdi_area) 
In km2. A country’s total area, excluding area under 
inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, 
and exclusive economic zones. Major rivers and lakes 
count as inland water bodies. Natural logarithm. 
QoG World Bank (2016). 2013 192  
15 Rugged terrain 
Terrain ruggedness 
index 
 (nunn_rugged) 
Average terrain ruggedness of the country’s land area. 
Measured in hundreds of metres of elevation difference. QoG Nunn and Puga (2012). 2012 190 
Higher values mean more 
ruggedness. 
16 Natural resources Oil rents (wdi_oilrent) 
Oil rents (% of GDP). Oil rents are the difference 
between the value of crude oil production at world prices 
and total costs of production. 
QoG World Bank (2016). 2013 188  
17 Population youth 
Young males in 
population 
(popym2013) 
Percentage of the population that is male between 20 
and 24 years old. – World Bank (n.d.). 2013 182  
18 Urban concentration 
Agglomeration 
index 
(agglo) 
Settlement concentration in %. Based on: population 
density, the population of a large urban centre (50,000 
or more), and travel time to that large urban centre. 
– Uchida and Nelson (2009). 2009 173 High number means high degree of settlement concentration. 
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Sources 
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S. and Wacziarg, R. (2003): “Fractionalization”. Journal of Economic Growth 8, 155-94.  
Allansson, M., Melander, E. and Themnér, L. (2017): Organized violence, 1989-2016. Journal of Peace Research 54 (4). 
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Appendix B – Control variable information 
This appendix shows information about the control variables, such as where the support for their use comes from and 
the relationship to the dependent variable that previous research has found. 
Table B.1 Information on the control variables 
No Phenomenon Measurement Support for variable found in Relationship with Y 
10 Low income levels L GDP per capita (l_unna_gdppc) 
Conor Devitt and Tol (2012); Fearon and 
Laitin (2003); Henderson (2000); 
Holtermann (2012); Krause and Suzuki 
(2005):  
Numerous studies links economic development or growth to civil war. Most civil wars occur in economically low-developed countries. It is in 
circumstances like these that we find weak states, new states and political instability, all linked to conflict. On the whole, economic development is 
found to reduce the probability of civil war. 
 Suggested explanations are for example that poverty facilitates rebel recruitment (lower opportunity costs) or that low economic development 
practically translates to lows state capacity and low state reach in the country (again lowering opportunity costs for rebels). 
11 Past conflict 
Violent conflict in 
2016 
(confl2016) 
Collier and Sambanis (2002); Uzonyi and 
Hanania (2017); Walter (2015). 
There is a large literature on civil war reoccurrence. There is a higher probability for sustained peace when one side defeats the other in the conflict, 
however this is not usually the case. Normally, a conflict ends with negotiation and settlement. This means that there is a higher risk for the conflict to 
start over again. Scholars have noticed that today’s civil wars are a problem of reoccurring civil wars. If a country has a history of civil war, the risk of 
civil war onset is substantially higher. 
 Time-series analyses of institutions’ effects on civil war often include lagged variables to address this. The variable used in this thesis is thought 
to provide context: If there was at least one incident in 2016 where 25 persons or more were killed, this could affect whether conflicts occur in 2017 
because people will have the previous conflict fresh in mind. 
12 Political instability 
Years without major 
political change  
(persist) 
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1996); 
Bjorvatn and Reza Farzanegan (2015); 
Diouma Bah (2014); Fearon and Laitin 
(2003); Maoz (1992); O’Rourke (2017); 
Pervez Memon, Sami Memon, Shaikh and 
Memon (2011); Schumacher (2013). 
Studies have found political stability to be a relevant predictor of civil war. Political instability increases the probability of civil war onset. In this this case, 
political instability, such as regime change, should not be confounded with simply the current regime, which could be an anocracy. 
 Other studies, neighbouring those on civil war, point to the importance of political stability. Political stability has, for example, been found to have 
an independent effect on war between countries, and those countries that have been targeted for covert regime by the U.S. are shown to be likely to 
experience civil war in the 10 years following intervention. 
 Studies also point to political stability’s role in keeping society integrated and upholding state legitimacy. This, together with the relationship 
between political stability and trust in politicians, could plausibly affect grievances and above all, the ability for politicians to reasonably commit to 
political promises, which could make citizens resort to violence instead. 
 On the economic side, political stability is often seen as a prerequisite for the economic development. Countries having high propensity of 
government collapse experience lower growth than others. Since economic performance also is a relevant predictor of civil war, this makes political 
stability relevant too, albeit more indirectly. Finally, as far as natural resources are concerned, studies indicate that higher resource rents increase 
political instability and intensify conflicts. Some of these studies, however, underlines that importance of separating natural resources from political 
stability for more precision in the analysis. It is possible that the natural resources of a country more specifically increase political instability, which, in 
turn, increase the propensity for internal conflict – thereby accentuating the role of political stability instead of just natural resources. 
13 
Inconsistent 
democratic 
institutions 
Polity is an 
anocracy 
(anocracy) 
Ellingsen and Gleditsch (1997); Hegre, 
Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch (2001); 
Muller and Weede (1990); Vreeland (2008). 
A regime’s political structure constrains or facilitates the political behaviour of its inhabitants by affecting opportunities for either peaceful or violent 
collective action. 
 The opportunity structures for dissident groups in semi-democracies allow dissidents to organise but, for these groups, nonviolent collective 
action may be too limited to be effective, so they resort to violence. 
 By far the highest frequency of internal conflicts is observed in semi-democracies, which manifests itself in an inverted U-shaped curve. 
Furthermore, dictatorships that allow more than one political point of view (multiple parties) practice higher levels of torture than closed dictatorships. 
 To sum up, the transition to democracy is complicated and may be marked by state failure and internal violence. 
14 Country size L Land area  (wdi_area) 
Buhaug (2006); Bleaney and Dimico (2011); 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Fearon and 
Laitin (2003). 
In many studies, country size is a factor that explains why countries experience internal conflict, e.g., by separatist movements or revolutionaries. 
 Possible reasons are that large countries have difficulties in projecting power over long distances or that the issue of governance becomes more 
difficult because of the extra layers of authority that is needed to control the population in large countries. 
 Other suggestions are that larger countries have higher numbers of peripheral or marginalised groups, or that ethno-regional heterogeneity is 
typical of large countries. 
15 Rugged terrain 
Terrain ruggedness 
index 
 (nunn_rugged) 
Bleaney and Dimico (2011); Buhaug, Gates 
and Lujala (2009); Fearon and Laitin (2003); 
Jimenez-Ayora and Ulubaşoğlu (2015) 
Rugged or mountainous terrain is significant for the onset and duration of civil wars in several studies. This may be due to difficulties for the state of 
projecting power in regions with rough terrain. This terrain can serve as a sanctuary for dissident groups and as a base for revenue raising. 
 These geographical elements are also linked to difficulties to form and sustain a successful polity where the constituents can cooperate and 
exchange effectively by lower transaction costs. Difficulties in cooperating increases the probability for conflict. 
16 Natural resources Oil rents (wdi_oilrent) 
Fearon and Laitin (2003); Buhaug, Gates 
and Lujala (2009); Rustad and Binningsbø 
(2010); Rustad and Binningsbø (2012); 
Lujala and Rustad (2012). 
High-value natural resources (e.g., oil and gemstones) are associated with dozens of armed conflicts and secessionist movements. From the second 
World War to our days, between 40 % and 60 % of all intrastate conflicts can be linked to natural resources. These are factors that can account for 
conflict recurrence and duration. If natural resources are associated with a conflict, the conflict is more likely to relapse, twice as quickly and it will last 
longer. 
 This might happen through several mechanisms: The resources might be the motivation for conflict. They might also constitute funding that 
raises the opportunity through purchases and recruitment. They may also aggravate existing conflicts. The conflict in mind tend to be civil war or the 
like but the resource curse may also entail consequences, through state institutions, that plausibly lead to less intensive types of conflict. For example, 
resource revenues may end up fuelling a predatory elite through increasing patronage, corruption and rent seeking. When a country is endowed with 
abundant natural resources, the political power also tends to focus on short-term gains. This may lead to overspending, poor investment and ill-
conceived economic policies, exposed to price shocks. All of which may increase inequalities and probabilities of internal conflict. 
17 Population youth 
Young males in 
population 
(popym2013) 
Ginges (2005); Karakaya (2015); Leahy, 
Engelman, Gibb Vogel, Haddock and 
Preston (2012); Marcus, Islam and Moloney 
(2008); Rivera (2010); Urdal (2006). 
Youth bulges are related to social violence and conflict. Looking at the civil conflicts (causing 25 deaths or more) from the seventies until the turn of the 
century, 80 percent of these occurred in countries in which at least 60 percent of the population is below the age of 30. When compared to countries 
that have a mature population structure, studies observe that the countries having a very young structure are three times more likely to experience civil 
conflict. 
 Developing countries often undergo a demographic transformation that increases the proportion of youths. This connects to conflict because the 
fast growth rate in the working-age population often exacerbate unemployment and prolong dependency on the parents. The low socioeconomic status 
of the youth may diminish their self-esteem and fuel frustrations, and this creates large pools of discontented youths in society. 
 These pools (of, plausibly, to a bigger part men) are thought to be more susceptible to recruitment into violent organisations and even rebel or 
terrorist groups because of their low opportunity costs. Participation in violent organisations could therefore become an instrument for power, prestige 
and identity that mitigates feelings of helplessness and insecurity. 
18 Urban concentration 
Agglomeration 
index 
(agglo) 
 
Büscher (2018); Beall, Goodfellow and 
Rodgers (2013); Hinds (2014); Lombard 
(2012); Maninger (2000). 
Urban conflict in global Southern cities is of increasing concern. Urban centres represent critical arenas in which violent conflict occurs. This is linked to 
the urbanisation of poverty, inadequate infrastructure and governance. 
 Urbanisation entails competition over access to resources and civic conflict is often associated with inherent urban qualities such as density, 
diversity and compressed inequality – often in combination with ethnic strife. 
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Appendix C – Descriptive statistics 
This appendix shows descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this thesis. 
Table C.1 Descriptive statistics of all variables 
No Phenomenon Measurement Valid N Mean Median Mode Minimum Maximum Histogram 
1 Quality of government 
Meritocratic recruitment 
(q2_a) 119 4.05 4  1.0 6.7 
 
2 Quality of government 
ICRG Indicator of Quality of 
Government 
(icrg_qog) 
139 0.53 0.47  0.1 1.0 
 
8 Ethnic division Ethnic polarisation (ethpol) 134 0.52 0.57  0.02 0.995 
 
9 Ethnic division Ethnic fractionalisation (al_ethnic) 186 0.44 0.43  0 0.9 
 
 Interaction Meritocratic recruitment x ethnic polarisation 89 2.09 2.01  0.05 4.98 
 
 Interaction ICRG QoG x ethnic polarisation 111 0.26 0.23  0.01 0.77 
 
 Interaction Meritocratic recruitment x ethnic fractionalisation 117 1.58 1.45  0 4.57 
 
3 
Low-intensity, 
internal 
conflict 
Violence against civilians 
2017 
(viol) 
66 94.85 18  1.0 769 
 
4 
Low-intensity, 
internal 
conflict 
Riots and protests 2017 
(riots) 68 179.88 51.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 3570 
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No Phenomenon Measurement Valid N Mean Median Mode Minimum Maximum Histogram 
5 Population Population (unna_pop) 193 36977528 7817818  9876 1362514304 
 
6 
Low-intensity, 
internal 
conflict  
L Violence against civilians 
per capita 
(l_viol_cap) 
66 -13.47 -13.55  -17.55 -9.50 
 
7 
Low-intensity, 
internal 
conflict 
L Riots and protests per 
capita 
(l_riots_cap) 
67 -12.60 -12.46  -17.22 -8.89 
 
10 Low income levels 
L GDP per capita 
(l_unna_gdppc) 193 8.63 8.70  4.914 12.07 
 
11 Past conflict Violent conflict in 2016 (confl2016) 194   0 0 1 
 
12 Political instability 
Years without major political 
change  
(persist) 
164 20.48 12.00  0 168 
 
13 
Inconsistent 
democratic 
institutions 
Polity is an anocracy 
(anocracy) 165   0 0 1 
 
14 Country size L Land area (wdi_area) 192 11.290 11.698  0.693 16.611 
 
15 Rugged terrain 
Terrain ruggedness index 
 (nunn_rugged) 190 1.39 0.96  0.003 6.74 
 
16 Natural resources 
Oil rents 
(wdi_oilrent) 188 4.81 0.0042  0 57.47 
 
17 Population youth 
Young males in population 
(popym2013) 182 8.71 8.97  5.11 13.16 
 
18 Urban concentration 
Agglomeration index 
(agglo) 173 50.74 52  4.7 100 
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Appendix D – Data manipulations 
On some rare occasions, the data was manipulated in order to increase the number of valid observations. Please, see 
below which variables that have been affected. 
Table D.1 Data manipulations 
No Phenomenon Measurement How the data was manipulated 
1 Quality of government 
Meritocratic 
recruitment 
(q2_a) 
 
2 Quality of government 
ICRG Indicator of 
Quality of 
Government 
(icrg_qog) 
 
3 Low-intensity, internal conflict 
Violence against 
civilians 
(viol) 
 
4 Low-intensity, internal conflict 
Riots and protests 
(riots)  
5 Population Population (unna_pop)  
6 Low-intensity, internal conflict  
L Violence against 
civilians per capita 
(l_viol_cap) 
 
7 Low-intensity, internal conflict 
L Riots and protests 
per capita 2017 
(l_riots_cap) 
 
8 Ethnic division Ethnic polarisation (ethpol)  
9 Ethnic division 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
(al_ethnic) 
 
10 Low income levels L GDP per capita (l_unna_gdppc)  
11 Past conflict 
Violent conflict in 
2016 
(confl2016) 
 
12 Political instability 
Years without major 
political change  
(persist) 
 
13 
Inconsistent 
democratic 
institutions 
Polity is an 
anocracy 
(cat_polity) 
The Polity variable from POLITY IV is supposed to run from -10 to +10. Some values, however, were originally coded -66 for “cases of foreign interruption”, -77 for “cases of 
“interregnum” and finally -88 for “cases of “transition”. Because of this, the number of valid cases drops. To prevent this, these values are recoded in the same manner that Coppedge et 
al. (2017) did for the Varieties of Democracy dataset. -66 is recoded to system missing, -77 is recoded to 0. There were no -88 values to recode. 
14 Country size Land area  (wdi_area)  
15 Rugged terrain 
Terrain ruggedness 
index 
 (nunn_rugged) 
 
16 Natural resources Oil rents (wdi_oilrent) 
As for oils rents (% of GDP), the World Bank data contained a missing value for Somalia. There were no values for the previous years either as reference. The value has however been 
set to 0.00 with the support of the following sources. Somalia is indeed thought to have a lot of oil resources. However, there seems yet to be no discoveries of this oil (Walls and Kibble, 
2012; Efui Ahali and Ackah,2014). Furthermore, Somalia does not have any oil industry or exports of crude oil as of 2018 according to CIA (n.d.). 
17 Population youth 
Young males in 
population 
(popym2013) 
There were no values for 2013 in the World Bank database. The closest value (10.36) is from 2010 and will be used instead. 
18 Urban concentration 
Agglomeration 
index 
(agglo) 
 
Sources 
CIA (n.d.). CIA World Factbook. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html 
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S., Skaaning. S. E., Teorell, J., David Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Steven Fish, S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Knutsen, C. H., Marquardt, K., McMann, K., Mechkova, V., 
Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Saxer, L., Efui Ahali, A. and Ackah, I. (2014): Oil Resource Governance in Somalia: Are they Susceptible to the Resource Curse? Munich Personal RePEc Archive paper 
no. 61211. Available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/61211/. 
Seim, B., Sigman, T. and Staton, J. (2017): V-Dem Codebook v7.1. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. 
Walls, M. and Kibble, S. (2012): Somalia: oil and (in)security. Review of African Political Economy, 39, pp. 525-535, DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2012.711079 
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Appendix E – OLS assumptions for model 7 
This appendix presents diagnostics used to check the OLS assumptions of model 7, that is, the full main model of the 
thesis’ analysis. 
Figure E.1 Linearity check 
 
 
 
 
Histogram E.1 Normality of errors – Histogram  Figure E.2 Normality of errors – P–P plot   Table E.1 Normality of errors – KS test 
 
 
 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Standardized 
Residual .141 33 .096 .955 33 .190 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 
 
 
Table E.2 Correlations 
 
L violence against 
civilians per cap 2017 
Meritocratic 
recruitment 
Ethnic 
Polarisation 
L GDP per Capita (Current 
Prices in US$) 
Political stability 
in years 
L Land area 
(sq. km) 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 
yo in population 
Interaction 1 Merit recr 
& Ethn pol 
Pearson 
Correlation 
L violence against civilians per 
cap 2017 1.000 -.346 -.027 -.219 .082 .100 .027 -.209 
Meritocratic recruitment -.346 1.000 -.111 .057 .227 -.339 -.174 .427 
Ethnic Polarisation -.027 -.111 1.000 .008 .189 -.060 .068 .840 
L GDP per Capita (Current 
Prices in US$) -.219 .057 .008 1.000 .340 -.002 -.319 .021 
Political stability in years .082 .227 .189 .340 1.000 -.249 -.057 .305 
L Land area (sq. km) .100 -.339 -.060 -.002 -.249 1.000 .307 -.196 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 
yo in population .027 -.174 .068 -.319 -.057 .307 1.000 -.012 
Interaction 1 Merit recr & Ethn 
pol -.209 .427 .840 .021 .305 -.196 -.012 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) L violence against civilians per 
cap 2017 . .024 .441 .110 .325 .289 .441 .122 
Meritocratic recruitment .024 . .270 .376 .102 .027 .167 .007 
Ethnic Polarisation .441 .270 . .482 .146 .370 .353 .000 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices 
in US$) .110 .376 .482 . .027 .495 .035 .454 
Political stability in years .325 .102 .146 .027 . .082 .377 .042 
L Land area (sq. km) .289 .027 .370 .495 .082 . .041 .137 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 yo 
in population .441 .167 .353 .035 .377 .041 . .474 
Interaction 1 Merit recr & Ethn pol .122 .007 .000 .454 .042 .137 .474 . 
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Figure E.3 The standardised residuals 
 
 
Table E.3 VIF values  Table E.4 Cook’s Distance 
Model Variables 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .988 1.012 
Ethnic Polarisation .988 1.012 
3 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .984 1.016 
Ethnic Polarisation .988 1.013 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .997 1.004 
4 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .923 1.083 
Ethnic Polarisation .935 1.069 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .880 1.136 
Political stability in years .797 1.255 
5 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .838 1.194 
Ethnic Polarisation .932 1.073 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .874 1.144 
Political stability in years .769 1.300 
L Land area (sq. km) .845 1.184 
6 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .833 1.200 
Ethnic Polarisation .929 1.077 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .759 1.318 
Political stability in years .751 1.331 
L Land area (sq. km) .758 1.319 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 yo in population .776 1.289 
7 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .060 16.787 
Ethnic Polarisation .022 44.652 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .732 1.367 
Political stability in years .713 1.403 
L Land area (sq. km) .691 1.448 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 yo in population .776 1.289 
Interaction 1 Merit recr & Ethn pol .018 54.332 
 
 N Valid 33 
Missing 162 
Minimum .00018 
Maximum .59135 
 
No case has a value above 1 which is one way of determining 
influential cases. However, using the “4/N” formula (0.1212 in this 
case), it becomes obvious that some cases might be influential. 
These cases are: 
Kenya .01370 
Bangladesh .01491 
Senegal .01511 
Benin .01525 
Tanzania .01645 
Turkey .03161 
Guinea .03631 
Jordan .03864 
Algeria .04515 
Iraq .12241 
Tunisia .14064 
Zimbabwe .21549 
Indonesia .22097 
Somalia .44892 
Israel .59135 
All these cases cannot be removed for several and obvious reasons, 
for instance because the number of observations will fall below 20 in 
the regression. However, a robust standard error’s model is run 
(model 9 in the analysis) that excludes the three cases with largest 
Cook’s D value, in order to see how the coefficients are affected. 
This procedure notably affected the normality of the errors to the 
better. Regarding heteroskedastic errors, the predicted vs actual 
residual plot also became better. 
 
 
Figure E.4 Plot of Cook’s D to spot influential outliers 
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Appendix F – OLS assumptions for model 35  
This appendix presents diagnostics used to check the OLS assumptions of model 35, that is, the full main model of the 
thesis’ analysis in table 5.4. 
Figure F.1 Linearity check 
 
 
 
 
Histogram F.1 Normality of errors – Histogram  Figure F.2 Normality of errors – P–P plot  Table F.1 Normality of errors – KS test 
 
 
 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov a Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Standardized 
Residual 
model 30 
.166 34 .019 .939 34 .056 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F.2 Correlations 
 
L riots and protests 
per cap 2017 
Meritocratic 
recruitment 
Ethnic 
Polarisation 
L GDP per Capita (Current 
Prices in US$) 
Years without major 
political change 
L Land area 
(sq. km) 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 
yo in population 
Interaction 1 Merit recr 
& Ethn pol 
Pearson 
Correlation 
L riots and protests per cap 
2017 1.000 .054 .211 .083 -.012 -.058 .000 .198 
Meritocratic recruitment .054 1.000 -.103 .098 .239 -.351 -.197 .434 
Ethnic Polarisation .211 -.103 1.000 .038 .188 -.072 .041 .840 
L GDP per Capita (Current 
Prices in US$) .083 .098 .038 1.000 .523 -.089 -.419 .075 
Years without major political 
change -.012 .239 .188 .523 1.000 -.311 -.258 .311 
L Land area (sq. km) -.058 -.351 -.072 -.089 -.311 1.000 .349 -.215 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 
yo in population .000 -.197 .041 -.419 -.258 .349 1.000 -.053 
Interaction 1 Merit recr & Ethn 
pol .198 .434 .840 .075 .311 -.215 -.053 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) L riots and protests per cap 2017 . .382 .115 .320 .474 .373 .499 .131 
Meritocratic recruitment .382 . .282 .291 .087 .021 .131 .005 
Ethnic Polarisation .115 .282 . .414 .143 .342 .409 .000 
L GDP per Capita (Current 
Prices in US$) .320 .291 .414 . .001 .309 .007 .337 
Years without major political 
change .474 .087 .143 .001 . .037 .070 .036 
L Land area (sq. km) .373 .021 .342 .309 .037 . .022 .111 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 yo 
in population .499 .131 .409 .007 .070 .022 . .382 
Interaction 1 Merit recr & Ethn 
pol .131 .005 .000 .337 .036 .111 .382 . 
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Figure F.3 The standardised residuals 
 
 
Table F.3 VIF values  Table F.4 Cook’s Distance 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment 1.000 1.000 
2 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .989 1.011 
Ethnic Polarisation .989 1.011 
3 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .979 1.021 
Ethnic Polarisation .987 1.013 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .988 1.012 
4 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .918 1.089 
Ethnic Polarisation .936 1.069 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .721 1.387 
Years without major political change .655 1.527 
5 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .834 1.199 
Ethnic Polarisation .932 1.072 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .716 1.396 
Years without major political change .617 1.620 
L Land area (sq. km) .814 1.229 
6 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .831 1.203 
Ethnic Polarisation .928 1.078 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .609 1.642 
Years without major political change .615 1.625 
L Land area (sq. km) .731 1.368 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 yo in 
population 
.716 1.396 
7 (Constant)   
Meritocratic recruitment .059 16.955 
Ethnic Polarisation .022 44.862 
L GDP per Capita (Current Prices in US$) .587 1.704 
Years without major political change .571 1.752 
L Land area (sq. km) .666 1.502 
Percentage of males 20 to 24 yo in 
population 
.716 1.397 
Interaction 1 Merit recr & Ethn pol .018 55.201 
 
 
N 
Valid 34 
Missing 161 
Minimum .00002 
Maximum .54253 
 
No case has a value above 1 which is one way of determining 
influential cases. However, using the “4/N” formula (0.1176 in this 
case), it becomes obvious that some cases might be influential. 
These cases are: 
Somalia .14529 
Indonesia .23975 
Israel .24461 
Rwanda .32308 
Tunisia .43364 
United Arab Emirates .54253 
All these cases cannot be removed for several and obvious reasons, 
for instance because the number of observations will fall below a 
sufficient number in the regression. However, a robust standard 
error’s model is run (model 37 in the analysis) that excludes the three 
cases with largest Cook’s D value, in order to see how the 
coefficients are affected. 
This procedure notably affected the normality of the errors to the 
better.  
 
 
Figure F.4 Plot of Cook’s D to spot influential outliers 
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Appendix G – Robustness check 1:  Ethnic fractionalisation 
This appendix shows OLS regressions, same as in table 5.1 but where ethnic polarisation has been replaced with ethnic 
fractionalisation. 
Table G.1 Meritocratic recruitment and fractionalisation. DV: “L violence against civilians per capita” 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII 
Meritocratic 
recruitment 
-.709** 
(.345) 
-.695* 
(.350) 
-.685* 
(.349) 
-.825** 
(.352) 
-.779** 
(.371) 
-.823** 
(.370) 
.476 
(1.073) 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation  
.592 
(1.067) 
.021 
(1.201) 
-.672 
(1.251) 
-.908 
(1.372) 
-1.548 
(1.462) 
6.018 
(6.055) 
Interaction Merit. 
recr. & Ethn. fract.       
-2.147 
(1.668) 
L GDP per Capita   -.263 (.255) 
-.464 
(.280) 
-.503 
(.296) 
-.705** 
(.339) 
-.674* 
(.336) 
Years without major 
political change    
.061 
(.039) 
.067 
(.042) 
.084* 
(.044) 
 
.083* 
(.043) 
L Land area     .117 (.257) 
.264 
(.283) 
.358 
(.289) 
Percentage of 
young males in 
population 
     -.625 (.522) 
-.453 
(.532) 
Constant -11.226*** (1.251) 
-11.632*** 
(1.461) 
-9.392*** 
(2.615) 
-7.460** 
(2.830) 
-8.718** 
(3.990) 
-2.960 
(6.225) 
-10.552 
(8.521) 
R2 .026 .047 .051 .059 .060 .092 .103 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
 
Appendix H – Robustness check 2: Different controls 
This appendix shows OLS regressions used to check whether meritocratic recruitment becomes significant with different 
controls than those in the main regression in section 5. 
Table H.1 Meritocratic recruitment and change of controls. DV: “L riots and protests per capita” 
 Model VIII Model IX  Model X  Model XI  Model XII 
Meritocratic 
recruitment 
.158 
(.366) 
.144 
(.373) 
.138 
(.389) 
.122 
(.433) 
1.105 
(1.476) 
Ethnic Polarisation 1.513 (1.216) 
1.490 
(1.235) 
1.471 
(1.287) 
1.452 
(1.326) 
7.011 
(8.082) 
Interaction Merit. 
recr. & Ethn. fract.     
-1.617 
(2.318) 
L GDP per Capita  .083 (.217) 
.083 
(.220) 
.082 
(.225) 
.069 
(.228) 
Ruggedness   .019 (.279) 
.023 
(.287) 
.014 
(.290) 
At least one conflict 
in 2016    
-.057 
(.617) 
-.077 
(.624) 
Constant -13.994*** (1.550) 
-14.542*** 
(2.131) 
-14.535*** 
(2.170) 
-14.433*** 
(2.464) 
-17.738*** 
(5.351) 
R2 .050 .055 .055 .055 .072 
N 34 34 34 34 34 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
 
 
 
